Scaling accountability through vertically integrated civil society policy monitoring and advocacy by Fox, Jonathan
WORKING PAPER
 DECEMBER 2016
Jonathan Fox
IDS_Master Logo
 Scaling accountability through 
vertically integrated civil 
 society policy monitoring 
 and advocacy
Author
Jonathan Fox is the director of the Accountability Research Center and a professor in the School of International 
Service at the American University in Washington, DC, USA. His website is www.jonathan-fox.org and his email is 
fox@american.edu. He can be followed on Twitter at @jonathanfox707.
Acknowledgements
This working paper was co-produced by the Empowerment and Accountability Research Programme – led by the 
Institute of Development Studies and funded by UK aid from the UK government – and Making All Voices Count. 
The first section draws substantially from a recent Issue Paper published by U4 (Fox and Aceron 2016). Thanks 
very much to Joy Aceron, Anna Levy, Brendan Halloran, Rosie McGee and one anonymous reviewer for their 
precise comments on the most recent version of this paper. Thanks to Joy Aceron, Walter Flores, Ariel Frisancho, 
Aránzazu Guillán Montero, Jeffrey Hall, Francis Isaac, Marta Schaaf and Nils Taxell for their precise and constructive 
comments on earlier versions. Thanks also to AU Accountability Research Center scholars Brandon Brockmyer and 
Suchi Pande for extensive discussions and specific inputs, and to Anu Joshi, Tiago Peixoto and Duncan Edwards for 
ongoing conversations. Lastly, thanks to Jennifer Joel for help with the bibliography. Background work on this paper 
was made possible thanks to support from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. That said, the author bears 
sole responsibility for the limitations of this work in progress. 
Production credits
Production editor: Karen Brock (k.brock@ids.ac.uk)
Copyeditor: Tim Woods (t.woods@greenink.co.uk)
Design: Lance Bellers (lancebellers@btinternet.com)
Cover design: Jonathan Fox and Waad Tammaa
Reference and copyright
IDS requests due acknowledgement and quotes from this publication to be referenced as: Fox, J. (2016) Scaling 
accountability through vertically integrated civil society policy monitoring and advocacy, Brighton: IDS
© The Institute of Development Studies 2016
2
WORKING PAPER Scaling accountability through vertically integrated 
civil society policy monitoring and advocacy
Contents
Executive summary 4
1. Introduction 4
Core distinction for empowerment and 
accountability: strategy and tactics 4
The structure of this paper 6
2. Unpacking different understandings of 
scale: from scaling up to “taking scale 
into account” 8
Scaling up 8
ICT and scaling citizen voice 10
Scale shift 11
Accountabilities of scale 12
Summing up the distinction between 
scaling up and taking scale into account 12
3. What is vertical integration? 13
The political economy roots of vertical 
integration 14
Vertical integration can address the 
problem of squeezing the balloon 15
Locally bounded citizen oversight misses 
upstream governance problems 15 
Different policy targets pose different 
challenges to vertical integration 16
Even partial vertical integration can 
bolster citizen leverage and voice 16
ICT’s capacity for multi-directional 
communication can enable vertical 
integration 16
How does the vertical integration of 
monitoring and advocacy relate to 
feedback loops? 17
4. Unpacking the relationships between policy 
monitoring and advocacy 18
5. Varied terms of state–society engagement: 
from two-dimensional to three-
dimensional approaches 20
Outsider protest and advocacy 20
Framing choices: constructive engagement 
or collaborative coalitions? 21
Framing choices: confrontational 
or adversarial? 22
Reframing state–society terms of 
engagement: from two-dimensional 
to three-dimensional 22
6. Grounding vertical integration 
in nine cases 23
Philippines 24
Textbook Count 24
Reproductive health law 24
Conditional cash transfer programme 24
India 25
Right to information campaign 25
Right to food campaign 25
Community monitoring in the 
National Rural Health Mission 26
Mexico 26
Community food councils
Maternal Mortality Observatory 26
Family planning budgets 27 
Comparative reflections 27
7. Looking forward: concluding questions 30
If scale shift matters, then how and 
why does it happen? 30 
Which analytical findings from the broader 
social science literature on collective action 
are relevant for understanding the citizen-
action process in the field of transparency, 
participation and accountability? 30
How can the black box of the state be 
unpacked to determine the mix of incentives 
and motivations that influences whether and 
how state actors respond to citizen voice? 30 
Annex 1. A menu of testable hypotheses 
for discussion 32
Menu of options: question and hypotheses 32 
Bibliography 35
Endnotes 45
3
WORKING PAPER Scaling accountability through vertically integrated 
civil society policy monitoring and advocacy
Executive summary
This working paper argues that the growing field of 
transparency, participation and accountability (TPA) 
needs a conceptual reboot, to address the limited 
traction gained so far on the path to accountability. 
To inform more strategic approaches and to identify 
the drivers of more sustainable institutional change, 
fresh analytical work is needed. This paper makes 
the case for one among several possible strategic 
approaches by distinguishing between “scaling up” and 
“taking scale into account”. This proposition grounds 
an explanation of the vertical integration strategy, 
which involves multi-level coordination by civil society 
organisations of policy monitoring and advocacy, 
grounded in broad pro-accountability constituencies. 
To spell out how this strategy can empower pro-
accountability actors, the paper contrasts varied terms 
of engagement between state and society, proposing 
a focus on collaborative coalitions as an alternative 
to the conventional dichotomy between confrontation 
and constructive engagement. The paper grounds 
this discussion by reviewing the rich empirical terrain 
of existing multi-level approaches, summarizing nine 
cases – three each in three countries – to demonstrate 
what can be revealed when TPA initiatives are seen 
through the lens of scale. It concludes with a set of 
broad analytical questions for discussion, followed 
by testable hypotheses proposed to inform future 
research agendas.
1. Introduction
Civil society initiatives in the new field of transparency, 
participation and accountability (TPA) are flourishing 
in the global South, yet governmental responsiveness 
often falls short of expectations.1 This limited impact 
underscores the need for reform initiatives to be 
rethought, using a lens that distinguishes more clearly 
between strategies and tactics. In retrospect, many TPA 
initiatives turn out to have been based on optimistic 
assumptions about the relationships between public 
information access, citizen action and institutional 
change. In response, this working paper is based 
on the proposition that the causal chain between 
transparency, participation and accountability is only as 
strong as its weakest link. This challenge underscores 
the relevance of developing more systemic approaches 
that distinguish between the causes and symptoms of 
accountability failures.
A conceptual reboot is in order, to inform a new 
generation of strategies that take entrenched 
institutional obstacles more fully into account. This 
involves focusing on both pro-citizen power shifts and 
bolstering the state’s capacity to respond to citizen 
voice as the main goals. One strategy worth more 
serious consideration involves the vertical integration 
of coordinated civil society policy monitoring and 
advocacy. This process seeks sustainable institutional 
change through the coordination of citizen action 
across local, subnational, national and transnational 
levels, while also broadening pro-accountability 
constituencies to extend their territorial reach and 
social inclusion.2 This proposition responds to a 
missing link in the field: the challenge of how to bolster 
impact by “taking scale into account”.3 In other words, 
how can strategies intended to promote inclusive 
governance address the multi-level nature of power 
structures?
The core rationale for trying to monitor each stage and 
level of public sector actions is to reveal more precisely 
not only where the main causes of accountability 
failures are located, but also their interconnected 
nature. After all, the forces of impunity are usually 
already vertically integrated, often through interlocking 
links within political machines and protection rackets 
(e.g. Chayes 2015). Understanding as many links in the 
chain of public sector decisions and actions as possible 
can identify more precisely where in the policy process 
“supply chain” change is most needed. 
The term “policy process” is used here to designate the 
full array of governmental decisions and non-decisions 
that shape public sector performance, including agenda-
setting, policy formulation and implementation. This 
approach puts coalition-building between social and 
civic actors with complementary strengths at the centre 
of the strategy: for example, national capital-based 
“infomediaries”, plus broad-based, locally grounded 
civic organisations, plus independent media and insider 
allies (if available). To contextualise the rationale for 
vertical integration, this working paper also contrasts 
different approaches to state–society relations, reviews 
the empirical landscape by summarising nine cases 
across three countries, and concludes with a set of 
testable hypotheses for discussion.4
Recent reviews of the evidence of accountability 
outcomes underscore why new strategic thinking is 
needed. While TPA efforts differ in terms of whether 
their main focus is local, national or international, they 
still tend to share the assumption that “information 
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is power”. In practice, however, information access 
and citizen voice are often not enough to deliver 
accountability (Halloran 2015; Joshi 2014; Fox 
2007a).5 Indeed, transparency and accountability 
initiatives are often poorly articulated, with seemingly 
related anti-corruption, democratisation and 
participation agendas (Carothers and Brechenmacher 
2014). A now-classic review of transparency and 
accountability initiatives found that transparency had 
very uneven and modest impacts on accountability 
(Joshi 2013; McGee and Gaventa 2010). A meta-
analysis of social accountability interventions found 
that many of them are too superficial and limited in 
scope to actually leverage accountability (Fox 2014). In 
addition, numerous “civic-tech” online platforms inspire 
hope for citizen voice to leverage better public service 
provision, but so far few have tangibly improved service 
delivery (Edwards and McGee 2016; Peixoto and Fox 
2016a, 2016b; Welle, Williams and Pearce 2016). 
In the global arena, a recent review of the evidence from 
international multi-stakeholder initiatives to promote 
open government (e.g. the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, the Open Government 
Partnership) finds that while they often manage to 
encourage the greater disclosure of information, they 
have reached few accountability gains (Guerzovich 
and Moses 2016; Brockmyer and Fox 2015).6 Recently, 
a remarkable World Bank Policy Research Report 
questions the depoliticised “social accountability” 
frame by making a strong case that the most promising 
transparency initiatives focus directly on bolstering 
specifically political accountability, by informing voters, 
sanctioning politicians and changing the incentives of 
non-elected public officials (World Bank 2016a).7  
On balance, the evidence available indicates that the 
dominant trend in the TPA field appears to be that “the 
rock keeps rolling back down the hill”.8 There certainly 
are success stories, but the broad pattern – in which 
so many efforts, in such diverse contexts, fall short of 
achieving tangible accountability gains – points to the 
relevance of a conceptual reboot.
Core distinction for empowerment 
and accountability: strategy and 
tactics
The relevance of the distinction between tactical and 
strategic approaches emerged from an inductive 
review of impact evaluations of social accountability 
initiatives, which allowed for a reinterpretation of what 
“mixed results” really means (Fox 2015, 2014). Rather 
than treat social accountability as a homogeneous 
category, this two-part review concluded that the 
umbrella category covered two quite different sets of 
initiatives: tactical and strategic.9 The low impact cases 
studied tended to be locally bound, tool-led and heavily 
reliant on information provision; higher impact cases 
were associated with multiple, multi-level, coordinated 
tactics, enabling environments for collective action, and 
coordination with governmental reforms that bolster 
public sector responsiveness. The review concluded 
that the key challenge is how to trigger a mutually 
reinforcing, reciprocal relationship between participation 
and accountability: “voice needs teeth to have bite, but 
teeth may not bite without voice” (Fox 2014: 36).
The terms “strategy” and “tactics” are often lumped 
together, leading one to be conflated with the other 
(not unlike “monitoring and evaluation”). To recall 
the distinction, strategies start with the overarching 
change goals and connect them to the action plan to 
reach them. In contrast, tactics are the more specific 
actions for carrying out the strategy (see box below). 
Tool-led approaches in the TPA field are tactical. They 
deploy citizen report cards, community monitoring, 
social audits, apps or open data, but often not as part of 
broader, multi-pronged, multi-level strategies. Military 
strategists have long emphasised the importance of the 
distinction from tactics, as in a widely cited observation 
attributed to Sun Tzu: “Strategy without tactics is the 
slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the 
noise before defeat” (although it turns out that there is 
no evidence that he actually said this). 
5
WORKING PAPER Scaling accountability through vertically integrated 
civil society policy monitoring and advocacy
When applied to contemporary accountability 
initiatives, tactical approaches have the following 
characteristics. They are: 
• tool-led interventions (often external)
• limited to citizen voice efforts
• information provision (assumed to inspire 
collective action that can influence public sector 
performance)
• limited to “local” arenas.
Strategic approaches, in contrast, are:
• multiple, coordinated tactics (can the whole be 
greater than the sum of the parts?)
• enabling environments for collective action, to 
reduce perceived risk
• citizen voice coordinated with governmental 
reforms that bolster public sector 
responsiveness (voice plus teeth)
• multi-level (linking local, subnational and 
national actors and targets)
• campaigns rather than interventions (iterative, 
contested and therefore uneven processes).
Sources: Fox (2015, 2014)
Differentiating tactics and 
strategies
The point of departure here is that strategic 
approaches are needed to address the underlying 
causes of accountability failures. Not all accountability 
problems are systemic – some may be the result of the 
proverbial “few bad apples”.10 In other words, specific 
cases may sometimes be the exception to the rule, and 
they can be addressed by sanctioning individuals or 
making small changes to rules or institutions, at least 
in places where the rule of law is applied more or less 
consistently. Then again, other accountability failures 
that come to light may reflect just the tip of the iceberg 
of otherwise invisible systemic issues. The proposition 
here is that systemic problems call for systemic 
responses (see box below). By no means does this rule 
out the potential relevance of incremental, localised 
or small-scale change, but it does suggest that a 
convincing theory of change would need to identify the 
rationale for the links in the causal chain that would 
plausibly connect such incremental changes to more 
systemic transformation. 
Strategies, more than tactics, are designed to take 
into account the possible reactions of both adversaries 
and allies.11 Consider the dynamic interactions 
inherent in chess, or the Chinese strategy game “Go”, 
rather than the assumed linear predictability of log 
frames. Development analysts increasingly emphasise 
“problem-driven, iterative adaptation” (Andrews, 
Pritchett and Woolcock 2013), though the metaphor of 
“sailboats, not trains” is more evocative of the non-
linear approaches often needed to reach difficult goals 
(Kleinfeld 2015). In spite of this broad rethinking in the 
field, and the increasing use of terms like “strategic”, in 
practice many initiatives in the open government and 
social accountability fields remain profoundly tactical, 
based on the assumption that “every little bit helps”. 
Yet that is not a theory of change.
The emphasis here on strategies that seek systemic 
change is based on the proposition that anti-
accountability forces, with their strong vested interests 
and deep pockets, are often quite effective at 
isolating, neutering and rolling back incremental pro-
accountability initiatives or institutional enclaves.12 
The need for systemic change in turn directs attention 
to accountability systems: the constellations of state 
and societal actors that together can deliver both 
answerability and enforcement (Halloran 2015, 
2014). However, because so many TPA initiatives 
are tactical, or invest in transparency without 
clear links to accountability, those initiatives that 
do take entrenched institutional obstacles more 
fully into account can be described as “doing 
accountability differently” (Fox and Aceron 2016). 
This phrase pays homage to an important proposal 
to rethink conventional approaches known as “doing 
development differently”.13 
The point of departure is the challenge of breaking 
out of self-reinforcing “low accountability traps” 
in which pro-accountability forces in both state 
and society are weak (Fox 2007b). The strategic 
challenge is how to trigger virtuous circles of mutual 
empowerment between these otherwise-weak pro-
accountability actors in ways that can offset anti-
accountability forces. At the most general level, the 
underlying analytical puzzle is how the whole can 
become greater than the sum of the parts, turning the 
weak into the strong.14
The structure of this paper
This working paper explores the dynamics of one 
among many possible strategies for accountability-
building. Other relevant strategies include focusing 
more on electoral paths to political accountability, 
bolstering public oversight agencies, strengthening 
the rule of law, and base-broadening approaches to 
constituency-building.15 The discussion here focuses 
on four general core questions: (1) Beyond scaling up: 
what does it mean to take scale into account? (2) What 
is the rationale for vertical integration? (3) What is the 
potential synergy between civil society organisation 
(CSO) policy monitoring and advocacy?16 and (4) 
How can we analyse varied state–society terms of 
engagement with a more three-dimensional approach?
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A growing body of academic research on the 
drivers of the institutional changes that address 
the causes of corruption and impunity suggest 
that they require mutually reinforcing changes in 
both state and society. Scholars point to “deep 
democratization” (Johnston 2014), a “big bang” 
approach involving multiple, mutually reinforcing 
policy reforms that overcome collective action 
problems (Marquette and Peiffer 2015; Persson, 
Rothstein and Teorell 2013; Rothstein 2011), 
inherently uneven “transitions to accountability” 
led by state-society coalitions (Fox 2007b), and 
“transitions to good governance” (Mungia-Pippidi 
2015). 
These diverse explanations of lasting institutional 
change share an emphasis on large-scale, 
nationwide, cumulative power shifts, as well as 
on windows of opportunity that are notoriously 
difficult to predict and hard for external allies to 
promote. This poses a challenge: how can pro-
accountability strategists address the need for 
deep power shifts when windows of opportunity 
are not open, and dramatic big bang shifts do not 
seem to be on the agenda – in other words, in 
most places, most of the time?
Recent explanations of systemic 
change question incremental 
accountability initiatives
This section focuses on seeking greater alignment 
between terminology, concepts and strategic 
approaches. This is based on the proposition that 
some widely used terms are used so loosely that 
they can mean all things to all people, which can 
make strategic pathways less, rather than more, 
visible. “Scale” is one such term, as will be discussed 
below. Another notable example in the development 
field is “intervention”, a term associated with 
initiatives that are externally driven, locally bound in 
geographic terms, involve a limited “toolkit” in terms 
of the action repertoire, and are constrained by a 
relatively short time frame (often 1–2 years), to align 
with conventional donor expectations and impact 
evaluation assumptions. Interventions are associated 
with treating in-country CSOs as subcontracted 
“implementing organisations” rather than as partners 
in agenda-setting. 
In contrast, the terminology associated with a 
strategic approach would be closer to the idea of 
“campaigns”, which creates more space for the 
organic involvement of diverse, existing actors 
closer to the ground, the deployment of multiple 
TPA actions at the same time, and the possibility of 
a longer-term approach. Campaigns, whether they 
are military, electoral, public awareness-oriented or 
commercial, are almost by definition more strategic 
than interventions (though campaigns certainly deploy 
interventions). In the TPA field, campaigns would be 
informed by conscious power analysis intended to 
target and weaken accountability bottlenecks while 
also empowering pro-accountability actors.17 Indeed, 
the clearest cases of “fully vertical” independent 
monitoring and advocacy initiatives are electoral 
campaigns, both partisan competitions for power 
and citizen vote-monitoring initiatives.18 Social 
accountability efforts may have a lot to learn from 
political accountability initiatives.
To ground the discussion, this paper then reviews 
nine cases of at least partial vertical integration, to 
begin to identify patterns of variation and the key 
questions that emerge.19 This evidence review focuses 
on three countries – the Philippines, Mexico and India 
– exploring three policy monitoring and advocacy 
initiatives in each. 
From the point of view of the Institute of Development 
Studies’ (IDS) new Empowerment and Accountability 
Research Programme, with its specific focus on 
fragile and conflict settings, the fact that these three 
countries are considered to have stable regimes, with 
political space for citizen voice and action, raises 
questions about the relevance of lessons from those 
experiences.20 They are relevant for three reasons. 
First, all three countries include subnational regions 
that fall into the “fragile and conflict settings” category, 
where socially grounded armed actors challenge the 
state’s legitimacy. Second, the “fear factor” is very 
relevant for accountability initiatives in those three 
countries, in spite of their elected regimes. Those three 
governments do not consistently defend their citizens’ 
human rights. For example, even in India, which has 
one of the most robust public information access 
systems in the world, more than 50 citizen information 
requesters have been murdered (Pande 2015). 
While the understudied fear factor is especially relevant 
for the challenge of promoting citizen voice in fragile 
and conflict settings, it is also a systemic problem in 
what appear to be stable regimes – yet it has not been 
addressed by studies of social accountability and open 
government. Third, these nine experiences with at 
least partial vertical integration all address the gaps 
between capital city non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and social organisations that are closer to the 
grassroots – a problem that is especially relevant in 
fragile and conflict settings.
Few of the nine cases profiled have received much 
scholarly attention, so the brief summaries draw 
primarily on grey literature and interviews with 
participants. In the Philippines, the cases are 
Textbook Count, the reproductive health law and their 
conditional cash transfer programme (4Ps). In India, 
the cases involve the right to information campaign, 
community-based monitoring within the National Rural 
Health Mission, and the right to food campaign. In 
Mexico, the cases are the community food councils, 
the Maternal Mortality Observatory and family planning 
budget reform. The reason for considering three cases 
within each country is to illustrate that where there 
is some political space, national civil societies may 
generate multiple vertically integrated initiatives. 
All nine cases involve multi-level monitoring and 
advocacy initiatives that target specific national public 
service delivery policies that directly affect social 
constituencies, and several involve the monitoring 
of policy implementation jointly with government 
counterparts. Because of the limited research base, 
the cases presented here are illustrations of “proof of 
concept” rather than definitive evidence. 
Another reason for profiling these nine cases is that 
tactical interventions tend to get more research 
attention. Indeed, from a methodological point of view, 
their “boundedness” makes the evaluation of their 
impact more methodologically tractable. Moreover, 
externally funded TPA initiatives are more likely to get 
the resources needed for in-depth research, which 
further tilts the literature away from addressing more 
organic, bottom-up efforts.21 The empirical case 
discussion here is less of a review of the evidence than 
it is a review of the need for more evidence. The cases 
summarised show that multi-level CSO initiatives are 
not so uncommon, though they are rarely studied 
through the lens of scale. This serves as a reminder of 
the disconnect between the broad range of “actually 
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existing” more strategic TPA experiences that should be 
documented and analysed, and the narrower range of 
cases that tends to be evaluated in detail. 
This working paper concludes by looking ahead to 
three big questions for future research agendas, 
including the issue of what drives transitions to vertical 
integration (i.e. scale shift), how to draw more lessons 
from existing literature on collective action, and how to 
get inside the “black box” of the state in order to better 
understand what motivates state actors. 
The annex proposes several preliminary testable 
hypotheses for discussion. Each suggested question 
responds to a specific dilemma involved in multi-
level strategies, and sketches out a very preliminary 
suggested method. Because of the central role of 
territorial variation involved in “scaling accountability”, 
the subnational comparative method would play a 
crucial role in testing hypotheses involving vertical 
integration.
2. Unpacking different understandings 
of scale: from scaling up to “taking 
scale into account”
To make progress towards the proposed conceptual 
reboot, this working paper pursues one among 
several possible missing links: the challenge of 
how to take scale into account. In the international 
development field, scaling up usually refers to doing 
more of something – as in “larger scale”. Instead, the 
focus here will be on the nature of scale, contrasting 
“scaling” with the notion of “taking scale into 
account”.22 Because the term “scale” can have very 
different meanings across fields and contexts, this 
section focuses on defining terms as precisely as 
possible.
The concept of scaling up is widely used, especially in 
the private sector, where it refers to growing companies 
and markets for products and services, as well as the 
social media process of going viral (the term has more 
than 5.4 million Google hits). The prospect of reducing 
costs per unit through economies of scale is a major 
driver, insofar as scaling allows for doing more with 
less (World Bank 2016b). In the technology business, 
scaling often refers specifically to an inflection point 
when linear turns to exponential growth.23 Yet applying 
private sector understandings of scaling up to “what 
works” in the public sector is limited by the very 
different sets of incentives involved in growing profit-
driven markets for private goods, versus the provision 
of public goods.24 
The idea of taking scale into account is especially 
relevant for accountability strategies that attempt to 
improve the quality of and access to public goods, 
as well as to reduce social exclusion and corruption. 
These problems are produced by multi-level systems 
in which the causes of the problems are often both 
discontinuous and opaque. From the point of view of 
strategies for bolstering public sector accountability, 
taking scale into account is intended to address 
the systemic embeddedness of anti-accountability 
forces across multiple levels and branches of a state 
apparatus. In other words, at each level of a state 
apparatus, anti-accountability forces are likely to gain 
strength from both vertical and horizontal coalitions 
(including private sector counterparts). Vertically, 
they may be part of coalitions with counterparts at 
the higher or lower levels, while horizontally, they 
may be part of coalitions with counterparts or other 
branches of the state at the same level (minister-to-
minister, governor-to-governor, or mayor-to-mayor, 
for example), not to mention relevant non-state actors 
(private sector, illicit actors, etc.).25 
If this hypothesised structure of links between anti-
accountability forces across scales is correct, then 
scaling up in the sense of doing more numerous – but 
disconnected – local initiatives may not be sufficient 
to generate the kind of power shift needed to crack 
self-reinforcing low accountability traps. This is why 
it may be useful to explore complementary notions of 
scale that are oriented to addressing power shifts.26 
In other words, the strategic concept of taking scale 
into account refers to articulating how different 
levels of development decision-making and practice 
interact with each other (from the local level to district, 
provincial, national and transnational arenas), both for 
the public sector and for civil society. 
Scaling up
In the development field, the most robust discussions 
of scaling up27 focus on expanding the reach of a 
specific innovation, based on a demonstrated pilot or 
local success (Kohl 2012; Linn 2012; Hartmann and 
Linn 2008; Simmons, Fajans and Ghiron 2007; Cooley 
and Kohl 2006).28 For example: 
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“… scaling up expands, replicates, adapts and 
sustains successful policies, programs and projects 
to reach a greater number of people … The 
process generally is not linear, but an iterative and 
interactive cycle as the experience from scaling 
up feeds back into new ideas and learning” (Linn 
2012: 1).29
The development policy literature on scaling up is 
mainly practitioner-oriented and focuses on how to do 
more of something in order to impact more people. As 
important as it is, experts conclude that, on balance:
“… remarkably little is understood about how 
to design scalable projects, the impediments 
to reaching scale, and the most appropriate 
pathways for getting there. Despite its centrality to 
development, scaling up is rarely studied in its own 
right and has undergone little scrutiny” (Chandy, 
Hosono, Kharas and Linn 2013: 3).
Yet some of the literature does focus on distinct 
pathways to getting more done by addressing the 
differences between replication, expansion, uptake 
via collaboration in coalitions or joint ventures, or 
mainstreaming and transfer to larger institutions. 
Each pathway has its own dynamics, which involve 
distinct pros and cons. Cooley and Kohl (2006: 11) 
observe that the key difference between expansion, 
replication and collaboration is “the degree to which 
the originating organization continues to control 
implementation as the model goes to scale”. Analysts of 
scaling up tend to agree that it is a stage in the process 
that leads from ideas and opportunities to development 
and testing, to making the case, to beginning to deliver, 
and then to grow / scale / spread (Gabriel 2014). 
Yet moving “onwards and upwards” along these 
pathways is easier said than done. Moreover, this 
literature has yet to be informed by the recent recognition 
of problem-driven, iterative adaptation (Andrews et 
al 2013). Indeed, in practice, many innovations fail to 
scale – to the point of a World Bank innovation expert 
proposing the metaphor of a Jeep stuck in deep mud, 
wheels spinning without moving forward. He concludes 
“you can’t replicate a solution to a complex problem … 
what scales is the approach and the process by which 
you develop solutions” (Walji 2016: 182, 190–191).30 
One of the most consistent characteristics of 
the literature on scaling up in the international 
development field is its intended audience. Analysis 
and recommendations are directed almost exclusively 
towards international bilateral and multilateral donors, 
to guide what they will propose that governments 
do. As a result, the pathways to scale are discussed 
from an external, top-down managerial point of view. 
This often means a primary focus on how to carry out 
decisions that have ostensibly already been made, with 
less attention to how those decisions are made. 
Yet this donor-oriented approach can also be seen 
through the lens of using targeted external funding 
to incentivise national decision-making about which 
issues deserve priority attention. This is the case, for 
example, of “vertical funds”, in which international 
donor consortia tackle problems (notably specific 
diseases with measurable outcomes) by providing 
mainly governments with targeted funding (Gartner 
and Kharas 2013). In this context, the relationship 
between scale and accountability involves upwards 
accountability from governments to donors. 
In contrast, if the primary audience for the literature on 
scaling up were national policy-makers, then the focus 
would more likely address how to build constituencies 
and coalitions inside and outside the state (or how 
to persuade donors). This would lead, in turn, to 
a different approach to the analysis of pathways 
– including, for example, more focus on agenda-
setting, or horizontal policy diffusion across issue 
areas or subnational governments. In this paper, the 
positionality of the analysis is explicit: the discussion 
of what it means to take scale into account is directed 
primarily to civil society actors (and their allies) that 
are interested in influencing the public sector – without 
the capacity to deploy donor funding as an incentive. 
The vertical integration proposition raises the 
question for CSOs of what is to be scaled up, and 
why. The development policy literature defines the 
“it” that is to be scaled in a very open-ended way; it 
can be a process or a product, or even a “package of 
interventions”, including the “managerial processes 
necessary for successful implementation” (Simmons 
and Shiffman 2007: 4). The process of independent 
CSO multi-level monitoring and advocacy pushes 
the concept of scale further, however. Instead of 
“managing more to get bigger”, the idea here is to 
“strategise at multiple levels to get more leverage” 
over powerful institutions. In other words, insofar as 
vertical integration involves civic action coordinated 
across territorial arenas (across districts and 
provinces) and levels (from local to subnational to 
national), the innovation already takes scale into 
account by definition, at least to some degree. 
Where vertical integration actually happens, it is 
often partial – connecting the local to the district 
level, or the national to the provincial, but falling 
short of systemic coverage – as will be discussed 
in more detail later in this paper. This leaves plenty 
of room for extending two-level strategies such as 
local-to-district links to reach up to provincial or 
national levels, or to scale territorially by broadening 
civic oversight “coverage” from one district to many. 
This is consistent with one of the conclusions of a 
recent comparison of US government-funded social 
accountability interventions: “focus on next-higher 
levels of government … financial, political, and 
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institutional support from officials immediately above 
those targeted by citizens’ social accountability efforts 
may be most critical” (Wetterberg and Brinkerhoff 
2016: 166). This focus on the relevance partial 
vertical integration is also consistent with an earlier 
set of robust research findings, which identified the 
characteristics of local organisations made them most 
effective at representing their members’ interests – 
and scaling up from local to the next-higher level stood 
out as key (Fox 1992a; Esman and Uphoff 1984).
The proposition here emphasises the importance of 
links between national, subnational and local policy 
monitoring and advocacy to reveal whether and how 
the public sector is responding to citizen voice. While 
national policy advocacy gains can certainly be won 
with either limited or no subnational links, in the 
absence of broad, bottom-up public oversight capacity, 
advocates will have great difficulty knowing whether 
or not their ostensible policy wins are actually being 
carried out in practice (this will be discussed further 
later in this paper). This poses the challenge of how 
can civic oversight strategies cover more of the public 
sector, both in terms of a vertical supply chain of service 
provision, from national to local, and in terms of its 
horizontal territorial reach across subnational regions? 
The challenge of how to increase the scale of CSO 
oversight’s coverage of public sector performance 
recalls the concept of the “last mile” (which has over 
1.2 million Google hits). This phrase is widely used in 
the telecommunications industry to refer to the final 
leg of networks that reach retail end-users. Other 
kinds of large-scale service provider organisations 
also use this term to refer to the challenge of 
reaching more clients, for example in health care.31 
The term implicitly conceptualises scale in terms of 
distance: the end-users are indeed far away from 
decision-makers, in so many ways. Yet where one 
stands depends on where one sits. Like the term 
“intervention” discussed earlier, last mile implies the 
outsiders’ view from above. In contrast, if one takes a 
“citizens’ eye” view, the last mile of service provision 
actually looks like the “first mile”, since it constitutes 
citizens’ immediate interface with the state (Boydell 
and Fox 2016). This is an issue insofar as theories 
of change in the TPA field depend on encouraging a 
menu of repertoires of action that are perceived as 
making sense to citizens.32 A citizen-centric approach 
would therefore look at state–society interfaces as a 
first mile rather than a last mile.33
ICT and scaling citizen voice
The dramatic spread of social media and mobile 
telephony has raised hopes for their potential leverage 
to broaden access to innovations in many other fields, 
and the TPA field is no exception. Yet this raises 
the issue of the differences between the more self-
propelled nature of profit-making, private services that 
go viral, and how initiatives to promote more and better 
public goods can take off. Citizen use of information 
and communications technology (ICT) for transparency 
and accountability has followed diverse pathways, 
insofar as digital media and mobile telephony have 
enabled some kinds of TPA initiatives much more than 
others. ICT has clearly enabled the rapid scale-up of 
transparency through digital media, especially in the 
sense of publicising scandals. Bad news travels fast, 
notably when responsible parties are well known and 
therefore available targets for naming and shaming. 
ICT has also clearly enabled the rapid scale-up in 
the projection of citizen voice for accountability in a 
wide range of settings, by facilitating decentred and 
crowd-sourced approaches to offline, as well as online, 
collective protest. Yet, at the same time, numerous ICT 
for development (often referred to as ICT4D) initiatives 
have not taken off, and well-intentioned but unused 
“zombie platforms” abound.34
One of the main questions involved in the analysis of 
ICT’s potential contribution to scaling voice involves 
the issue of embeddedness. To what degree are ICT 
innovations embedded in, or emerge organically in 
response to, the felt needs of social and civic actors? 
Here, there is a notable difference between the viral 
citizen uptake of messages of protest or exposures of 
abuse on the one hand, and the many well-intentioned 
platforms and apps in the ICT4D field that have yet 
to resonate widely. Viral uptake presumably indicates 
that the innovation or message actually resonates with 
citizen perceptions and priorities. 
This is the distinction between demand-driven and 
supply-led ICT innovation. Alternatively, one could 
frame this issue in terms of the distinction between 
tactics and strategies, in which “app-led” initiatives are 
one kind of “tool-led” approach, in contrast to strategic 
initiatives in which specific ICT innovations are designed 
to enable the other moving parts in a multi-pronged 
campaign to gain more uptake and resonance. Though 
a strategic, demand-driven approach may be key for 
defining the problem that an ICT innovation could solve, 
for campaigners who are not tech specialists it is not 
obvious what possible ICT solutions are potentially 
viable. This underscores the need for balanced dialogue 
between ICT producers and users, so that the producers 
can see with greater precision how their creativity 
can enable change strategies, while accountability 
advocates can appreciate both the strengths and 
limitations of what ICT innovations can offer.35
To understand the interactions between citizen voice, 
scale and impact on institutions, it is useful to bring 
in notions of directionality. ICT allows citizens to 
dramatically broaden the horizontal projection of voice 
– to each other. Communicating shared grievances, 
building collective identity and creating virtual 
communities certainly both constitutes and facilitates 
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collective action; in other words, bringing many voices 
together to become louder in order to increase the 
prospect of being heard.36 
Clearly, ICT both accelerates and aggregates voice. 
Yet viral messages may be insufficient to scale up the 
kinds of shared meanings that are needed for disparate 
citizen concerns to come together to form cohesive, 
collective, social or civic actors (e.g. Joia 2016: 430). 
Moreover, few social media platforms lend themselves to 
the nuanced deliberative processes that are required to 
make the transition “from protest to proposal”, as some 
Latin American public interest groups put it.37 From the 
point of view of scaling advocacy, this suggests that 
ICT may be more relevant for projecting voice to put 
problems on public agendas than for the “next step” of 
building constituencies for specific policy alternatives.38
Horizontal projection of voice to build broader 
constituencies is distinct from projecting voice 
vertically – by targeting the messages in ways that 
communicate effectively with elites. This distinction 
raises the question of what kinds of messages and 
targeting manage to be heard by those in power 
(this comes up in the discussion of whether and how 
feedback loops actually close, in Section 3). 
A third kind of directionality that can be considered 
is diagonal, when social media campaigns manage to 
transcend their original online communities to get the 
attention of potential allies and convert them from mere 
third parties into relevant actors that can pressure anti-
accountability forces.39 This dynamic predates ICT; the 
literature on the US civil rights campaign called them 
“reference publics” (Lipsky 1968) and the literature 
on transnational advocacy campaigns emphasises the 
“boomerang strategy” (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
In principle, the horizontal and diagonal projection 
of voice may be the key steps on the causal chain 
towards successful vertical “messaging”; that is, 
getting authorities to listen. If that is the case, then 
focusing primarily on institutional responses to voice 
as the key indicator (as in Peixoto and Fox 2016b) 
skips over key links in the causal chain. Multiple waves 
of horizontal and diagonal resonance may be needed 
in order for citizen voice to influence the calculus of 
those in power that will shape whether they will listen. 
This dynamic is usually understood in terms of the 
capacity of digital messaging to raise the political cost 
for certain elite actions, and that certainly can produce 
short-term impacts. A minister might fall in response to 
a scandal that goes viral, but that does not mean that 
the systemic problems that might have produced the 
scandal will change. Insofar as addressing the causes 
rather than the symptoms of accountability requires 
a power shift rather than just a wave of embarrassing 
media hits, the question this poses for ICT4D is 
whether and how digital media can help to broaden the 
constituency that demands accountability. 
ICT’s capacity to shape messages about the causes of 
specific problems is indeed crucial. The literature on 
policy-making stresses the importance of communicating 
“causal stories” in order to influence agendas for change 
(Stone 1989). This idea raises the question of how ICT’s 
capacity to shape and transmit messages can help to 
delegitimate the authors of problems, while legitimating 
solutions? This broadening and deepening of citizen 
demand for accountability is likely to be a medium-term 
process, which poses challenges for short-term time 
horizons for measuring impacts.40
Both the conceptual frameworks and empirical evidence 
on the contribution of ICT to scaling voice – specifically 
for transparency and accountability – still lag behind 
practitioner effervescence in the field. From the point of 
view of trying to understand the relationship between 
citizen voice and empowerment on the one hand, and 
public accountability on the other, the dynamics of how 
ICT mediates that relationship remains unclear. The 
ICT-enabled projection of citizen voice may or may not 
lead institutions to respond with more accountability, 
and research on this issue is only just beginning 
(e.g. Edwards and McGee 2016). 
Social media allows millions to speak and can clearly 
enable collective action, either with evocative hashtags 
or with “flash mob” style street actions (as well as the 
corresponding disempowering capacity of the state for 
surveillance, both perceived and real). The potential 
for synergy between online and offline collective action 
is now widely recognised. But the question remains 
whether and how such actions manage to influence 
whether those in power actually listen – without even 
addressing the increasing tendency of authoritarian 
regimes to close access to digital media. This puzzle 
will be addressed further in Section 3, in the context of 
whether and how feedback loops close. 
Scale shift
The concept of “scale shift” is also relevant for analysis 
of TPA initiatives through the lens of scale Political 
sociologists who analyse social movements have long 
been interested in the processes through which localised 
collective actions spread and grow to become social forces 
of national scope, with the capacity to transform state–
society relations (Tilly and Tarrow 2015). Historically, 
mass collective action that scales up from local to national 
arenas is one of the key pathways through which 
intensely held citizen voice is projected with sufficient 
political clout to get the attention of national elites. 
The projection of citizen voice from local to 
transnational arenas – sometimes, though not always, 
resonating nationally – can also be described as a 
scale shift (Soule 2013; Tarrow 2010, 2005; Tarrow 
and McAdam 2005). This view goes beyond the idea 
that more scale (more mobilisation) means more power 
for change; it also involves taking scale into account 
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by recognising greater capacity for that mobilisation 
to target power-holders at multiple levels. Indeed, 
movement strategists often respond to blockages in 
one arena by redeploying efforts to target other arenas 
that may be more responsive to social movements’ 
rights claims (e.g. Pande 2016). This drives the classic 
boomerang strategy, in which local movements for 
rights respond to the closure of national politics by 
reaching out to international allies to triangulate 
external pressure on authoritarian elites (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998), as well as the “sandwich strategy” 
combining pressure from above and below (Fox 1992b).
In this literature, the process of scale shift is driven by 
two main mechanisms: brokerage and diffusion (e.g. 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Diffusion refers to a 
process of horizontal replication of collective action 
which may or may not be driven by organised actors. 
What analysts call the “attribution of similarity” may be 
sufficient for local actors in one area to feel common 
cause when they learn about actions that pursue 
shared agendas in another area, especially if grounded 
in a pre-existing shared collective identity. The concept 
of “linked fate”, drawn from the analysis of the process 
of racialisation, is very relevant here (Dawson 1994).
Political sociologists recognise that brokers also make 
key contributions, creating links across the pre-existing 
social networks that are widely recognised as key for 
the capacity to mobilise. Brokers can be seen as nodes 
in networks. They can be cross-cultural interlocutors, 
“old school” grassroots organisers, local notables 
(“grasstops”) or insider allies within the state. Brokers 
are especially important for scale shifts that reach 
upwards, since they can provide local movements with 
the necessary information to target specific bottlenecks 
(or potential allies) within the system.41 In the language 
of social capital, brokers provide the “bridging social 
capital” needed to connect existing, more horizontal 
“bonding social capital” (Woolcock and Narayan 2000). 
To sum up, the concept of scale shift is quite 
compelling: it has the advantage of explicitly 
addressing the question of how social actors transition 
from localised to broader scales of action, through 
“upward scale shift”,42 yet the literature that uses 
the concept deploys it primarily in an illustrative 
way. The empirical literature that applies the concept 
systematically to actual cases, to spell out both its 
processes and mechanisms, remains limited.43
Accountabilities of scale
New concepts may be needed to apply the concept of 
scale to the analysis of “accountability production”. To 
take this economic metaphor further, the concept of 
“economies of scale” is relevant. Economies of scale refers 
to investments in which the pay-off from each additional 
increment grows with scale. Put another way, the idea 
refers to how the increased size or scale of an initiative 
influences the cost of each unit produced, with the cost 
per unit generally decreasing with increasing scale, as 
fixed costs are spread out over more units of output. 
The concept of “accountabilities of scale” is analogous, 
suggesting three relevant insights. First, as the 
capacity for demanding accountability grows, the cost 
of each additional unit of accountability goes down 
as more accountability is generated. In other words, 
the more accountability one has, the more one can 
get. Conversely, the less accountability one has, the 
more difficult it is to get each additional degree of 
accountability (as in self-reinforcing low accountability 
traps). Second, local accountability reforms are not 
part of a continuous process in which they necessarily 
“scale up” to influence higher levels, while national 
accountability reforms do not automatically “scale 
down” to subnational and local levels (Fox 2007b). 
Third, the inverse of economies of scale can also 
apply. That is, “diseconomies of scale” may prevent 
an accountability initiative that works as a pilot from 
being effective once scaled up – especially if its 
success is made possible by local factors that are 
difficult to replicate. This risk is especially relevant for 
participatory development initiatives, which may lose 
their edge in a transition from artisanal to industrial 
scale (Chambers 2005; Blackburn with Holland 
1998). In response, Gaventa (1998: 155) proposed 
the concept of “scaling out” to refer to participatory 
processes that both grow in scale (more participants) 
and in scope (participation over more decisions).
The notion of accountabilities of scale reminds us that 
the process of scaling accountability is fundamentally 
discontinuous. This suggests that incremental 
approaches may not generate expected impacts, while 
years of toiling to build policy advocacy capacity – 
apparently fruitlessly – could have significant impact if 
and when the political context shifts and political elites 
become more open to policy alternatives.44
Summing up the distinction 
between scaling up and taking 
scale into account
Most conventional approaches to social accountability and 
transparency do not take scale into account in the sense 
that is suggested here. On the one hand, most social 
accountability initiatives (such as community scorecards) 
are locally bounded; on the other, most open government 
initiatives rely on national agencies to disclose official 
budget or activity data, which is rarely disaggregated in 
citizen-friendly or actionable ways.45 These initiatives are 
often limited by their approach to scale: local interventions 
remain localised, rarely spreading horizontally or 
extending their leverage vertically by influencing higher-
level authorities, while national initiatives based in capital 
cities risk circulating primarily among the already-
convinced, or remaining limited to cyberspace and 
delinked from offline civic action. 
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In contrast, vertically integrated accountability 
initiatives attempt to take scale into account by 
linking citizen action at the grassroots with action 
at the national level, while seeking to broaden their 
coverage horizontally in terms of the geographic and 
social inclusion of excluded citizens. Multi-level citizen 
oversight initiatives can gain additional traction if the 
evidence they produce manages to trigger actions by 
public oversight institutions (also known as checks and 
balances, or horizontal accountability).46 The concept 
of scale shift is especially relevant here because it 
begins to address the challenge of transitions to multi-
level approaches. How do campaigns or movements 
for accountability manage to broaden their coverage, 
to address systemic bottlenecks by targeting the 
foundations of anti-accountability coalitions? 
To sum up, scaling up usually refers to doing much 
more of something. Indeed, when a pilot activity is 
considered to “work”, then replication is certainly 
called for. Yet replication may not be enough to 
address the underlying systemic, multi-level causes 
of accountability failures.47 How to do that depends 
on the specific context, but taking scale into account 
involves focusing on how to scale impact rather than 
just seeking scale (growth) per se, as Guerzovich and 
Poli (2014) suggest. In other words, while scaling an 
activity often refers to doing more of something, scaling 
impact requires strategically addressing the causes of 
accountability failures. In other words, taking scale into 
account involves more than replication or expansion; it 
links pro-accountability actors across scale in order to 
promote mutual empowerment and to either target or 
bypass accountability bottlenecks (see box, right).
3. What is vertical integration?
One practical application of this idea of taking scale into 
account involves the “vertical integration” of civil society 
policy monitoring and advocacy. Vertical integration 
tries to address power imbalances by seeking the 
coordinated, independent oversight of public sector 
actors at local, subnational, national and transnational 
levels. The goal is for the whole to be greater than the 
sum of the parts. The core rationale for monitoring 
each stage and level of public sector decision-making, 
non-decision-making and performance is to reveal 
more precisely not only where the main causes of 
accountability failures are located, but also their 
interconnected nature. This focus on understanding as 
many links in the chain of public sector decisions as 
possible is relevant, both to inform possible solutions 
and to empower the coalitions needed to promote them. 
Vertical integration of public oversight puts coalition-
building between social and civic actors with different but 
complementary strengths at the centre of the strategy; 
for example, CSO policy analysts plus membership-
based civic organisations to do bottom-up oversight 
and advocacy, plus independent media to disseminate 
both the findings and the citizen action. If government 
reformists are also willing to invest their often limited 
political capital in insider–outsider coalitions, better still.48
In principle, government oversight agencies could do 
what CSO-led vertical integration tries to do: reveal a full 
X-ray of the entire chain of public sector decisions and 
performance in any given sector. Very few agencies have 
the necessary autonomy, capacity and mandate to do so, 
however.49 Those rare government agencies that can do 
it should certainly be the focus of both civil society and 
international support. Yet often the best that government 
oversight agencies can do is respond to high-profile 
scandals with official investigations that may, at best, 
expose the chain of events behind specific incidents. 
But public sector oversight agencies rarely address 
broader issues about the effectiveness of entire policies, 
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As an example, consider a social accountability 
initiative that involves community interface 
meetings between health clinic workers and 
communities. In this case, scaling up as 
replication would mean convening them at more 
clinics (e.g. from 10 to 50 to 500 villages). 
Yet the underlying causes of medicine stock-
outs or abusive staff may lie far “upstream”. If 
civil society oversight efforts to address these 
problems were to do accountability differently 
and make connections horizontally, they would 
broaden their territorial reach to bring together 
democratic representatives from those 10, 50 
or 500 grassroots communities. Such meetings 
could then ground a strategy to build a broad-
based civic or social process that would not only 
have significant evidence-generating capacity, but 
also the civic clout needed to persuade policy-
makers to act on those findings – especially 
regarding problems in the health system that 
are caused by factors located beyond their 
respective clinics. In this scenario, broadening 
an initiative’s social and geographic reach 
horizontally provides the platform from which to 
project voice “upwards” – vertically – towards 
power-holders.
For social accountability 
initiatives, what would taking 
scale into account look like?
programmes or institutions; when they do, it is more 
often in the anti-corruption context than in issues 
relating to broader governance failures, such as systemic 
ineffectiveness or social exclusion. Audit bureaus, public 
prosecutors, ombuds agencies, legislative investigation 
committees and human rights commissions can 
sometimes investigate and reveal specific cases of abuse. 
This can provide some degree of answerability, but actual 
enforcement usually depends on the autonomy and 
capacity of the system for administering justice.50 For the 
sustainable institutionalisation of public accountability, 
these horizontal checks-and-balances agencies are 
crucial. One of the main potential contributions of 
independent public oversight initiatives involves both 
triggering and bolstering their autonomy and capacity.
Another set of institutions capable of vertically 
integrated oversight are donors, yet their primary focus 
is on “upwards accountability”, from aid-receiving 
governments to donor agencies. This involves numerous 
initiatives that treat governments as homogeneous, as 
in the case of performance indicators associated with 
the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable 
Development Goals. In the health field in particular, donor 
initiatives focused on specific problems involve vertically 
integrated monitoring and oversight, but they often lack 
a public-facing dimension. The focus here, in contrast, is 
on the kind of accountability efforts that not only disclose 
to citizens general, nationwide government performance 
trends, but also reveal where bottlenecks are, identify 
leakage points, show how inequality is expressed, and 
pinpoint who makes the key decisions that produce 
accountability failures throughout the supply chain of 
governance. In other words, while national performance 
indicators may be “actionable” for donors, much more 
targeted kinds of information need to be actionable for 
citizens and national public interest groups. 
This section unpacks the idea of vertical integration 
from several different perspectives. Beginning with 
the term’s origins in political economy, the discussion 
addresses: the relationship between vertical integration 
and problem of “squeezing the balloon”; the limits to 
locally bounded citizen oversight; the significance of 
different kinds of policy targets; the role of “partial” 
vertical integration; the relevance of ICT’s potential 
for scaling multi-directional communication; and the 
elusive prospect of feedback loops. 
The political economy roots of 
vertical integration
The term vertical integration originates in early 
20th century political economy, where it refers to an 
enterprise’s control of its own supply chain, including 
both backward links (inputs, parts) and forward 
links (distribution, sales and service). In contrast to 
the business context, where “integration” refers to 
centralised control, in the civil society realm the term 
points much more loosely towards the coordination of 
independent monitoring and advocacy capacity across as 
much as possible of the governance process – from policy 
debate and agenda-setting to the formulation of policy 
and budget decisions, as well as to their implementation 
throughout different agencies and levels of government.51 
Figure 1 illustrates this process of CSO oversight, which 
runs parallel to the vertical layers and structures of 
governance. In practice, “full” vertical integration of 
independent policy monitoring and advocacy is rare, 
since it involves a relatively high degree of institutional 
capacity as well as many “moving parts”. Yet, even partial 
degrees of vertical integration (e.g. from local to district 
or provincial levels) can generate more comprehensive, 
and therefore stronger, civil society oversight efforts. 
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Figure 1 Seeking synergy: multi-level independent policy monitoring and advocacy
Source: Fox and 
Halloran (2016); 
design by Jonathan 
Fox and Waad 
Tammaa
Vertical integration can address the 
problem of squeezing the balloon
The expression “squeezing the balloon” conveys 
the way in which authorities and vested interests 
may resist independent oversight efforts by either 
deflecting or eluding reform efforts (Fox 2014, 2001). 
Officials deflect when they point the finger elsewhere 
in response to CSO monitoring and advocacy efforts, 
claiming that the actions in question were really 
decided elsewhere, in a different agency or at a 
different level of government. For example, municipal 
authorities may claim the problem lies with the 
provincial or district government. Those subnational 
authorities may in turn point the finger either back 
downwards to the local level, or upwards to the national 
level. National officials, in turn, may claim that the 
problem resides at the subnational level, or they blame 
international actors. International actors, in turn, are 
quite capable of side-stepping their co-responsibility by 
shifting blame to national or subnational governments. 
The second challenge of the squeezing the balloon 
problem emerges when the targets of citizen oversight 
adapt by modifying their corrupt practices. The corrupt 
are flexible and they are quite capable of shifting 
their efforts to where opportunities are greatest and 
oversight is weakest. As funding flows through long 
chains of official decision-making, and public scrutiny 
is only able to shine the spotlight on one or two of 
those stages, then “leakage” is likely to shift to those 
decision-making processes that remain in the dark. 
For example, in some large-scale, government-
sponsored rural community development programmes 
that include citizen oversight mechanisms (e.g. 
India’s rural employment guarantee programme or 
Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program on 
rural development), it seems that corrupt officials 
have responded by inventing new and less visible 
ways to divert funds, shifting from wage theft to 
the manipulation of billing practices (e.g. Shankar 
2010; Olken 2009).52 In other words, the squeezing 
the balloon phenomenon means that programme 
monitoring that is exclusively local in scope may well 
manage to change the “shape” of the “corruption 
market”, but not necessarily the volume of corruption 
(Zimmerman 2015). In response to this problem, the 
core rationale for trying to monitor each stage and level 
of public sector decision-making, non-decision-making 
and performance is to reveal more precisely not only 
where the main causes of accountability failures are 
located, but also their interconnected nature. 
Locally bounded citizen oversight 
misses upstream governance 
problems 
The World Bank’s 2004 World Development Report 
legitimated citizen voice as a constructive input to 
improve the governance of public service delivery. This 
may have helped to open up bounded yet non-trivial 
space for freedom of association and expression in 
very closed societies. Yet this influential conceptual 
framework did not address the issue of scale for 
citizen action and accountability. Instead, the report 
circumscribed the acceptable role of citizen voice 
exclusively to the local arena and limited the targets 
of legitimate public oversight to frontline service 
providers. This worked in some cases, where the 
combination of community access to information 
about service provision and the creation of invited 
spaces for citizen voice improved local service delivery 
performance, leading to improved social indicators. 
Still, high impact outcomes have been both rare and 
difficult to replicate. 
Key problems lie beyond reach, even for empowered 
communities. For example, medicine stock-outs at the 
clinic level may be caused by diversions further up in 
the health ministry’s chain of command, or they have 
been undersupplied because senior health ministry 
officials overpaid corrupt providers in exchange for 
kickbacks (e.g. Vian 2008). Even apparently local-
level problems may be caused by factors located well 
upstream, such as when health-care workers demand 
informal payments from patients because they had 
to pay to get their job, or are required to pass money 
from patients up the chain of authorities (Schaaf 
and Freedman 2015). Similarly, schools may suffer 
from absent teachers not because of their individual 
idiosyncrasies, but rather for more systemic reasons. 
If teachers are absent from the classroom because 
they are busy working for the ruling party, then the key 
accountability failures are located upstream, where 
decisions about hiring and firing are made – and far 
from the reach of school-level parent committees (e.g. 
Altschuler 2013).53
In retrospect, it appears that the 2004 World 
Development Report’s exclusive focus on local voice 
led many influential stakeholders to expect that they 
could achieve tangible, sustained service delivery 
improvements without investing in the scaled-up 
civil society base-broadening and capacity-building 
that would be needed to challenge upstream vested 
interests effectively. After more than a decade of large-
scale international CSO work on social accountability, 
neither the academic nor the “grey” literature has 
presented evidence that investments of development 
aid in localised interventions have generated broad-
based, scaled-up power shifts that multiply beyond the 
immediate area of influence of international funding.54 
For example, in one of the most influential donor-led 
social accountability interventions (Bjorkman and 
Svensson 2009), the powerful evidence of impact 
did not trigger national replication or uptake. This 
gap underscores the need to rethink how to do 
accountability differently, including a more sustained 
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emphasis on constituency-building, which underscores 
the relevance of the distinction between interventions 
and campaigns. 
Different policy targets pose 
different challenges to vertical 
integration
If broad coalitions are essential to combine 
independent CSO oversight capacity with civic muscle, 
even then vertical integration remains very challenging. 
The nature of the challenge depends on the policy 
target. For example, the task of monitoring the social 
and environmental impacts of large, geographically 
concentrated infrastructure projects is more potentially 
bounded – and therefore more feasible – than 
inherently more dispersed health, education, water 
or agricultural policies. In addition, there is a big 
difference between services that consist of tangible, 
measurable goods such as medicines, textbooks or 
crop loans, versus the delivery of numerous, relatively 
autonomous “high touch” skill-based providers such as 
nurses or teachers (World Bank 2004).55 
Policy targets also vary in terms of whether they 
involve proposed changes – such as budget planning, 
community consultations or socio-environmental 
impact assessments that precede big project 
decisions – versus policies or programmes that are 
already well under way. Indeed, two decades of 
experience with advocacy campaigns targeting World 
Bank-funded, high-impact infrastructure projects – 
often vertically integrated – suggests that they can 
exercise much more leverage before project decisions 
are made, in contrast to afterwards, when contracts 
are signed, vested interests have grown and their 
machinery of power is fully engaged (Clark, Fox 
and Treakle 2003; Fox and Brown 1998).56 In this 
sense, effective policy monitoring can increase CSO 
reform leverage insofar as it can inform and bolster 
preventative, rather than just reactive, approaches to 
abuse and corruption. 
Even partial vertical integration 
can bolster citizen leverage and 
voice
Clearly, the vertical integration of CSO oversight is an 
extremely ambitious goal and few organisations have 
the institutional capacity needed for the “full coverage” 
of an entire policy process (from agenda-setting to 
formulation through implementation), even in a narrow 
issue area. “Partially integrated” policy monitoring 
refers, then, to citizen oversight of some, but not all, 
dimensions or levels of a public sector process. The 
proposition here is that in spite of the challenge posed 
by squeezing the balloon, public oversight of even 
some of the links in a chain of public sector decisions 
(or non-decisions) can make a significant difference, 
especially if the monitoring is articulated with problem-
solving collective action that can also reach across 
scale.57 
The conditions under which partial vertical integration 
of citizen oversight can make a difference are far from 
clear. Convincing answers would require extensive 
subnational comparative research that focused on 
specific programmes and selected cases on the 
variance in the scale of citizen oversight (Snyder 
2001). Yet the absence of systematic research on 
partial vertical integration that takes scale into 
account should not be confused with a lack of relevant 
participatory pro-accountability experiences that could 
be analysed. Around the world, local grassroots social 
and civic initiatives become visible – and influential 
– precisely when they scale up and come together at 
regional and subnational levels. Upon investigation, it 
may turn out that multi-level approaches often emerge 
in the process of adaptive learning, as accountability 
defenders respond to opportunities and constraints, 
rather than as the result of a conscious strategy 
detailed in advance.58
ICT’s capacity for multi-
directional communication can 
enable vertical integration
In principle, the potential contribution of ICT to 
independent citizen monitoring of the public sector 
is straightforward. If citizens can become the eyes 
and ears of an oversight initiative, then they can now 
gather and forward information in real time. To counter 
claims that such citizen reports are “merely anecdotal”, 
or come from unreliable sources, user-friendly tablet 
devices can make possible the consistent reporting of 
key indicators of public sector performance, and allow 
the real-time aggregation of data. In practice, defining 
such indicators and ensuring that data-gathering is 
consistent and user-friendly may require significant 
experimentation. 
In principle, the potential contribution of ICT to 
advocacy is straightforward, through at least four 
pathways: (1) by facilitating collective action; (2) 
by targeting bottlenecks and specific elites through 
naming and shaming; (3) by aggregating data to reveal 
patterns of accountability failures; and (4) by getting 
the attention of potential allies. ICT can project both 
voice and evidence, and development agencies are 
exploring the potential for citizens to report a wide 
range of possible problems with tech tools such as SMS 
(short message services), or for more trained monitors 
to use tablets. 
Visual communication is also crucial for 
communicating the results of more technical 
transparency and accountability initiatives that try 
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to “squeeze the juice” out of open data. Around the 
world, clever online platforms make important data 
available to inform public debate, yet translating that 
data into accessible visuals and messages that can go 
viral, or incorporating it into everyday citizen action 
repertoires through “targeted transparency”, is crucial 
(Fung, Graham and Weil 2007). What constitutes 
relevant and actionable information, for whom, and 
who decides remain major questions for the TPA field. 
Infomediaries are civic tech organisations that are 
dedicated to extracting, processing, translating and 
disseminating otherwise arcane data and converting 
into information that is meaningful to citizens.59 Yet the 
degree to which infomediaries’ agendas are supply-
driven versus demand-driven varies widely, and the 
challenge of how to understand the information needs 
and interests of their potential constituencies remains 
widely debated.60
Digital media allow for a broadening of the kind of 
evidence that citizens can project: it is not limited to 
the kind of “hard data” that has attracted greatest 
interest in the tech for development field. A review of 
23 ICT platforms for projecting citizen voice, targeted 
to service delivery, found some uptake but less impact: 
voice without teeth (Peixoto and Fox 2016a; Bayern 
2015). In contrast, from an advocacy point of view, 
pictures are still worth a thousand words, whether 
they are of human rights abuses, politicians’ private 
mansions or cash changing hands. Citizen journalists 
around the world have demonstrated the power of 
crowdsourced images to generate viral uptake of 
evidence for accountability. This broader notion of 
“open evidence” for accountability contrasts with 
the more focused emphasis of open data on a very 
specific kind of evidence (big data sets that require 
substantial investment and a clear advocacy target 
to be rendered intelligible, relevant and actionable). 
This suggests that the frame for exploring ICT’s 
contribution to bolstering the resonance and uptake 
of pro-accountability messages should emphasise the 
visual communication and “civic design” as much as 
the data. 
How does the vertical integration 
of monitoring and advocacy relate 
to feedback loops?
The relationship between the concept of feedback 
loops and citizen voice is less obvious than it may 
seem. Citizen voice can certainly offer authorities 
evidence regarding public sector performance based on 
direct experience, and this can guide problem-solving. 
Feedback initiatives that are staffed can have the 
capacity both to respond to specific citizen concerns in 
a granular way, and to reveal patterns of problems to 
authorities (e.g. channels for reporting specific public 
service delivery problems, such as the famous 311 city 
telephone hotlines in the USA, or Fix My Street).61 
Other feedback initiatives, by pre-determining a menu 
of options for soliciting citizen views, may limit citizen 
voice to specific agendas. Some feedback systems only 
ask for input after the key decisions have been made, 
as in the case of customer or “beneficiary” satisfaction 
surveys, creating only the appearance of input. In other 
words, the design of citizen feedback initiatives can 
have either inclusionary and exclusionary implications 
(see diverse cases in Peixoto and Fox 2016a). Official 
feedback initiatives may serve to indicate whether 
the state is doing something right, but not whether 
the state is doing the right thing. Both citizen-led and 
state-led feedback loops also face the challenge of 
whether and how they actually close.62
For ICT-enabled feedback loops to connect with the 
vertical integration strategy, their relationship to pro-
accountability advocacy needs to be problematised. 
Clearly, ICT-enabled voice can play an agenda-setting 
role, revealing and naming previously unrecognised 
accountability failures (e.g. police violence against 
unarmed citizens). Yet crowd-sourced voices have 
limited capacity to negotiate with authority about 
what to do about these new agendas. If and when the 
political space created by voice makes it possible for 
the excluded to gain a seat at the table, who decides 
who is going to sit there and negotiate on behalf of 
those whose voices are trying to be heard?63 
This raises the issue of which actors control the terms 
of engagement, an issue addressed in the literature 
on “invited” versus “claimed” spaces (Cornwall and 
Schattan Coelho 2007). The question then is how can 
the scaling up of voice transition from aggregation 
to representation? This process involves not only 
large numbers of people speaking at once, but the 
consolidation of organisations that can effectively 
scale up deliberation and representation as well, most 
notably, internally democratic mass membership 
organisations (Fischer 2016; Chen, Jhabvala, Kanbur 
and Richards 2007; Fox 2007b).64 This question of 
the capacity of usually excluded people to build their 
own representative organisations to set agendas 
and have a seat at the table is crucial, whether one 
is looking at invited spaces for issue-specific state–
society deliberation or at the formal systems of political 
representation via parties.65
The proposition here is that for the analysis of 
accountability, feedback loops can contribute to a 
broader set of channels for expressing citizen voice, 
which is most usefully understood as involving both 
the aggregation and the representation of the views 
of otherwise-excluded citizens. But the question of 
whether and how feedback loops actually close calls for 
much more analysis, of how citizen voice interacts with 
incentives and power within the public institutions that 
are supposed to respond to citizen voice.
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4. Unpacking the relationships 
between policy monitoring and 
advocacy
Public oversight is understood here as potentially 
including both monitoring and advocacy, though a 
preliminary scoping of the civil society landscape 
suggests that, in practice, relatively few CSOs 
do both.66 This working paper also defines policy 
monitoring broadly, including classic “follow the 
money” efforts that seek to identify leakages, 
independent assessments of the performance of public 
sector agencies, as well as rights-based approaches 
that document patterns of exclusion, bias and abuse. 
Public interest advocacy refers here to a spectrum of 
possible efforts to influence the policy process in favour 
of the public interest, ranging from agenda-setting to 
policy-making and implementation. By this definition, 
advocacy can include a broad menu of possible citizen 
actions, ranging from the local to the global, and from 
the more collaborative to the more adversarial.67
Policy monitoring and advocacy may in principle need 
each other, but it turns out that they involve quite 
different kinds of actors and repertoires of action. 
Investigative journalists and whistle-blowers play 
a central role in setting public agendas for change 
by revealing accountability failures to the public. In 
national capitals, independent policy analysts and think 
tanks that dedicate themselves to extracting, processing 
and disseminating government data – sometimes called 
infomediaries – are very well positioned to reveal the 
government’s priorities by monitoring the legislature 
or analysing the budget. In contrast, partnerships with 
broad-based membership organisations, with their 
thousands of eyes and ears on the ground, make it 
possible to monitor actual government performance and 
to encourage citizen voice and action. 
The potential complementarity between technically 
skilled CSOs and large, membership-based social or 
civic organisations puts the challenge of building and 
sustaining cross-sectoral, multi-level coalitions at the 
centre of the practice of vertical integration. In the 
context of such often-delicate processes of building 
coalitions among very different kinds of organisations, 
which underscores the need for balanced power-sharing 
and transparent decision-making, the term “integration” 
can be interpreted as implying an undue degree of 
centralisation. The rationale for using the term, however, is 
to emphasise the goal of creating synergy, to be produced 
by coordination among multiple CSOs that play different 
roles and work across scale, for reasons discussed further 
in this section (see also Figure 1 in Section 3).
The convergence of independent CSO monitoring 
and advocacy, cutting across different policy arenas, 
is deeply embedded in the history of transnational 
civil society (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The roots of 
the contemporary repertoire include the World Bank 
advocacy campaigns of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(e.g. Clark et al 2003; Fox and Brown 1998). These 
campaigns linked local to global CSOs to draw public 
attention to large-scale infrastructure and extractive 
projects that imposed social and environmental costs 
on stakeholders who were denied free, prior and 
informed consent.68 In the absence of public scrutiny of 
timely and independent assessments of the risks and 
benefits of such investment decisions, governments 
and interested parties tend to underestimate their 
social, environmental and economic costs, while 
over-estimating the benefits – which tend to be 
concentrated in social sectors that are not expected to 
bear the costs. 
Large-scale infrastructure and extractive projects 
are also well-known for creating huge opportunities 
for corruption. One could hypothesise that the larger 
the project, the more economies of scale in favour of 
corruption. Yet the dynamics of such “lumpy” project-
level investment decisions present clear targets for CSO 
monitoring and advocacy, in contrast to entire sector-
wide national policies, for example. Indeed, outside 
of this specific genre of large footprint projects, the 
strategic coordination of CSO monitoring with advocacy 
seems less common, especially in the provision of 
widely dispersed public services or anti-poverty 
programmes; hence the focus on profiling a wide range 
of cases in Section 6 of this paper.
The goal of bringing independent monitoring and 
advocacy together is to find synergy between the 
evidence-generating potential of policy monitoring 
and the civic muscle that broad-based advocacy 
campaigns can bring to bear (as illustrated in 
Figure 1). Yet combining these approaches requires 
coalition-building strategies that take into account 
the diversity among potential participants. CSO policy 
monitoring and advocacy often involve groups with 
very different goals, skills, repertoires and theories of 
change. For example, advocacy goals grounded in the 
strongly felt needs of organised social constituencies 
may not involve what evaluation experts would 
consider “rigorous” policy monitoring. Affected 
groups may conclude that they already have the 
18
WORKING PAPER Scaling accountability through vertically integrated 
civil society policy monitoring and advocacy
information they need in order to justify their cause. 
After all, in the eyes of citizens who have long been 
subjected to corruption, discrimination or abuse, the 
prospect of making significant efforts to generate 
“objective” data to demonstrate what is already 
obvious to them may seem like a poor investment of 
limited organisational resources. 
Furthermore, there may be drawbacks to implying that 
the legitimacy of their cause depends on producing 
what constitutes “proof” in the eyes of others. 
After all, the empirical basis for the assumption 
that rigorous evidence provides the leverage that 
will improve policy is not clear (Eyben, Guijt, Roche 
and Shutt, 2015; Green 2013). A political economy 
approach suggests that interests as well as ideas 
drive policy decisions, a point that circles back to the 
civic muscle needed to harness evidence to move 
accountability reforms forward. 
From a public-interest advocacy logic, independent 
policy monitoring involves significant costs and is 
not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end, 
such as exposing and naming previously invisible 
problems, reframing public debates, garnering 
mainstream media coverage, identifying “smoking 
guns” with specific perpetrators, producing a “killer 
statistic” with the potential to go viral, or influencing 
national and international politicians or technocrats 
who are receptive to evidence. These goals involve 
more than technical monitoring capacity; they also 
require advocacy strategies that draw on skills such 
as working with the media, coalition-building and 
mass citizen action, as well as the knowledge and 
relationships needed to identify potential insider 
allies. 
Coalition-building involves managing political and 
cultural differences among allies (Fox 2010). While 
CSO policy monitoring and advocacy clearly vary in 
terms of the skill sets and organisational capacities 
involved, the two approaches may be associated 
with different political strategies. In practice, policy 
monitoring is often associated with a “constructive 
engagement” approach. Yet if the primary goal is to 
improve policy implementation by plugging leaks and 
identifying performance problems in partnership with 
officials, this can discourage the direct questioning 
of the overall policy or of the key assumptions behind 
it. Such partnerships may limit CSO policy monitors’ 
independence, constraining them from publicly 
revealing the governance problems they encounter, 
and thereby leaving the question of whether and 
how to address the problems to their governmental 
coalition partners.69 
Advocacy campaigns, in contrast to monitoring, 
usually focus on agenda-setting and changing 
policy formulation, rather than just on improving the 
implementation of existing policy. Their theories of 
change may lead them to want to expose the vested 
interests that oppose policy reform, insofar as their 
goal is to address the causes of accountability failures. 
As a result, CSO policy reform advocates often deploy 
adversarial pressure politics and may invest less in 
documenting the details of how implementation works 
out in practice. 
In addition, the institutional geographies of monitoring 
versus advocacy processes may be quite different, 
insofar as credible policy monitoring requires broad 
geographic coverage to document broad patterns of 
government actions, decisions and non-decisions at 
subnational and local, as well as at national, levels. In 
contrast, advocacy campaigns may be able to influence 
the national government even though their “area of 
influence” is confined to the capital city.70 Indeed, 
some advocacy campaigns are sufficiently adept at 
insider–outsider networking and media presence that 
they can create a “Wizard of Oz” effect, effectively 
projecting the appearance of far greater clout than 
advocates actually have.71 
Legislative lobbying power, media access or citizens 
in the streets of the national capital may certainly be 
enough to change laws or policies, but the persisting 
question is whether the behaviour of the public sector 
actually changes, especially where “stateness” may 
be low.72 This is the reason for the emphasis here on 
the role of organised social and civic constituencies, 
with their thousands of eyes and ears on the ground, 
to build the countervailing power needed to fulfil 
the potential of synergy between advocacy and 
monitoring.
The proposition is that in spite of these differences, 
monitoring and advocacy each have complementary 
strengths; each approach can contribute to the 
other.73 Independent monitoring efforts generate 
the kind of evidence of government performance 
needed to identify specific ways in which policies 
should change.74 Most notably, independent policy 
monitoring can inform possible policy alternatives 
by seeking to identify the causes of governance 
problems, rather than just focusing on their 
symptoms. In addition, independent monitoring 
capacity can generate the credible evidence that 
advocacy campaigns may need to reframe debates, 
to generate positive media coverage, to isolate 
adversaries and to win over allies.75
Moreover, if and when advocacy campaigns do win 
policy victories, they need some degree of bottom-up 
monitoring capacity in order to identify the degree 
to which new laws and policies are actually put into 
practice. Participatory policy monitoring, as well as 
civil society engagement with other kinds of power-
sharing institutions like policy councils, can go beyond 
a “compliance” focus to invest civil society’s political 
capital in strengthening the actual capacity of state 
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actors to effectively carry out pro-accountability 
policies (i.e. strong states need strong societies). 
This last challenge underscores the importance of the 
geographic breadth of policy monitoring coverage. How 
do advocacy campaign know, for example, whether 
and where the legal or health authorities throughout 
the country will respect policy wins in practice? For 
such campaigns, independent monitoring capacity can 
inform future decisions about where and how to target 
bottlenecks that may block the implementation of their 
policy wins. In this potentially virtuous circle, evidence-
gathering informs advocacy campaigns, then advocacy 
wins inform monitoring, which in turn informs future 
advocacy (as illustrated in Figure 1).76
To sum up, this issue of how to generate synergy 
between monitoring and advocacy raises the specific 
issue of how to construct and sustain coalitions that 
bring together socially and politically diverse pro-
accountability actors, including reaching across the 
state–society divide in pursuit of shared goals. 
5. Varied terms of state–society 
engagement: from two-dimensional 
to three-dimensional approaches
Conventional discourse in the TPA field frames 
state–society “terms of engagement” along a 
two-dimensional continuum that ranges from 
“confrontational” to “constructive” engagement. This 
section spells out the limitations of this widely assumed 
dichotomy and explains why theories of change for 
accountability-building need a more three-dimensional 
approach, which can account for diverse combinations 
of conflict and collaboration between actors in state 
and society.
Outsider protest and advocacy 
The multi-level monitoring and advocacy approach 
developed here, even where civil society-led, often 
requires some degree of engagement and dialogue 
with the state. Reviewing the cases of vertical 
integration that have emerged so far in an ongoing 
review of the empirical landscape, the evidence of 
accountability failures produced by monitoring is 
often deployed in dialogue with government reformers 
that at least nominally accept the principle of 
evidence-based policy-making. CSO capacity to gain 
broad coverage in terms of independent monitoring 
of the public sector across territories, or upwards 
through the supply chain of service delivery, often 
requires some degree of institutional partnership or 
official access – though public access to information 
laws can enable more arms-length approaches. 
Yet collective action that more directly challenges 
state authority is also relevant for understanding 
empowerment for accountability.
Purely outsider advocacy for accountability can 
certainly make a difference, especially when backed 
by civic muscle through mass protest – though 
protest movements can also turn out to be ephemeral 
or get dismantled by backlash (e.g. Carothers and 
Youngs 2015). Analysts of social movements have 
long addressed the question of the motivations and 
dynamics of collective action, which may involve 
recognising a productive role for anger that does 
not fit easily into conventional discussions of 
accountability initiatives.77 Indeed, even outside the 
social movement context, micro-level state–citizen 
interfaces may involve “rude accountabilities” that 
have received little research attention in the TPA field 
(Hossain 2010). Empowerment for accountability 
may take the form of larger-scale civic resistance, a 
repertoire that involves a deep scepticism towards 
engagement with governments (or specific agencies, 
such as the police) perceived as illegitimate. The 
research literature on accountability has only barely 
begun to consider lessons and insights from citizen 
engagement that takes the form of mass direct action 
(e.g. Beyerle 2014).
Insofar as purely outsider movements rely on the 
power of numbers for both disruptive power and broad 
legitimacy, scale matters greatly. The dynamics of 
diffusion of mass mobilisation are a major concern 
for analysts of social movements (e.g. Kolins Givan, 
Roberts and Soule 2010; McAdam et al 2001; Piven 
and Cloward 1979). Research on collective action also 
emphasises tipping points when movements reach a 
“critical mass” (Marwell and Oliver 1993). This would be 
analogous to the definition of “scaling up” that focuses 
on inflection points from linear to exponential growth.
Among purely outsider movements that manage to 
scale up and become national, some directly reject 
a regime’s legitimacy.78 Here, the most clear-cut 
cases of the relationship between empowerment 
and accountability involve direct challenges to 
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authoritarian regimes. The overthrow of dictatorships 
by mass protest movements are cases of political 
accountability par excellence, and regime change 
through non-violent “people power” has become a 
widely emulated strategy, at least since the fall of 
Philippines’ dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. Most 
resistance movements do not get this far, but some 
manage to hold authoritarian regimes at bay, or even 
create long-term, de facto subnational dual power 
situations that include alternative public accountability 
institutions (e.g. the Zapatista territory in Chiapas, 
Mexico, or the Kurdish territory in Syria). 
Extensive research literatures address puzzles such as 
when does repression lead to more versus less protest, 
and under what conditions broad-based civic resistance 
wins or loses.79 In the field of transparency, participation 
and accountability, however, analysis of the relationship 
between empowerment and accountability has yet to 
draw relevant lessons from either the very broad, multi-
disciplinary literature that addresses motivations for 
collective action, or the more specialised literature on 
how social movements take off.80
Among outsider protest and advocacy campaigns, 
the distinction between monitoring and advocacy is 
still relevant. Policy monitoring can identify where key 
decisions are really made, as well as more vulnerable 
pressure points, and is therefore relevant for targeting 
protest for maximum “efficiency”. If such adversarial 
approaches manage to extract policy concessions, they 
are usually uneven and partial at best. Moreover, official 
promises of institutional change made in negotiations 
during peak mobilisation are often broken once 
protesters go home. As a result, even “pure” outsider 
campaigns need some independent monitoring 
capacity in order to identify where to concentrate 
subsequent rounds of protest. 
This “monitoring for targeting pressure” involves 
distinguishing between those elements of the state 
that oppose accountability reforms most strongly, 
versus those that have some interest in moving them 
forward (if any).81 Even in the absence of explicit 
insider–outsider coalitions, the influence of protest on 
the state takes the form of empowering some elements 
of the state to deliver, while weakening other elements 
within the state to block concessions.82 This interactive 
process, in which external societal pressure shifts the 
balance of power within the state, can be understood 
through the lens of the “state–society synergy” 
framework (Fox 2007b; Evans 1996). 
Framing choices: constructive 
engagement or collaborative 
coalitions?
The TPA field includes a wide range of approaches to 
the terms of engagement between state and society, 
but the dominant frame in international development 
agencies poses a dichotomy between what are termed 
“constructive engagement” and “confrontational 
relationships”.83 In contrast, this paper’s emphasis 
on seeking analytical leverage on the dynamics of 
multi-level synergy between monitoring and advocacy 
questions that dichotomy. In practice, existing 
accountability initiatives pursue diverse combinations 
of more versus less collaborative terms of engagement 
with the state (depending on which part of the state 
they are dealing with). This is especially the case for 
participatory accountability initiatives that emerge 
organically from ongoing state–society accountability 
debates – as in Brazil, India or Mexico – in contrast 
to external donor-led interventions, especially in 
aid-dependent countries, which tend to accept the 
conventional constructive engagement frame. 
In principle, the constructive engagement approach 
(collaborative partnerships between reformists in 
government and civil society) can strengthen insider 
reformists by providing them with civil society backing, 
as well as with eyes and ears on the ground. However, 
policy-makers often expect civil society partners to 
abstain from any public criticism of the government, 
which in turn might reduce CSO leverage. After all, 
willingness to consider an exit option increases 
bargaining power. Indeed, the experience in the 
Philippines suggests that government participants 
in these partnerships tend to discourage their CSO 
partners from publicly targeting anti-accountability 
forces in government, since an adversarial approach 
would carry the risk of a political backlash against 
the insider reformers (Fox and Aceron 2016). Insider 
allies may also fear that CSO revelations of governance 
failures will be used against them in the next election, 
even if they are not responsible for the problems. At 
the same time, from the CSO point of view, if their allies 
lose the next election, that could close future doors. 
The constructive engagement frame may be most 
relevant in more closed political contexts. Where 
there is little-to-no political space for autonomous 
civil society, freedom of association or the press, 
subordinated alliances with more enlightened elements 
within government may be the only avenue open for 
CSOs to address governance failures. The creation 
of modest “free spaces” for even very constrained 
collective deliberation and action could turn out to 
be significant in the future, if and when authoritarian 
regimes liberalise (e.g. Ethiopia, Mexico, Rwanda or 
Zimbabwe, in the 1970s and 1980s).84
The term “constructive engagement” may well 
constrain strategic thinking, insofar as the language 
conceals the full range of possible collaborations 
between reformers in state and society. The word 
“constructive” implies that adversarial approaches are 
necessarily not constructive, yet insider reformists may 
well need external pressure on anti-reform forces to 
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gain leverage. In other words, strategic state–society 
coalitions may actually combine CSO collaboration with 
pro-reform forces in government on the one hand, with 
conflict that is targeted to weaken the vested interests 
in government that oppose reform on the other. As 
an alternative, the term “state–society coalitions for 
change” leaves room for this productive deployment of 
adversarial approaches and therefore captures a more 
strategic approach to collaborative change than does 
the term “constructive engagement”.85 
Framing choices: confrontational 
or adversarial?
Turning to the other side of the conventional 
dichotomy, “confrontational” implies – at least for 
unsympathetic governments and some international 
donors – the implicitly illegitimate questioning of 
authority, often through what are assumed to be 
extra-institutional means.86 Setting aside for a moment 
that in democracies, (non-violent) extra-institutional 
protest is recognised as a core, legitimate part of 
the policy process, the question of what counts as 
confrontation raises the fact that “where you stand 
depends on where you sit”. For example, when citizens 
question authorities in official forums in ways that 
independent observers may consider to be firm but 
polite, combining evidence to support a critique with 
proposals for change, those officials who are expected 
to listen may well experience such questioning as 
indeed confrontational – especially if these exchanges 
take place in public. After all, “answerability” – a core 
element of accountability – may make those authorities 
who are questioned feel uncomfortable. 
Yet this potential for discomfort is the causal 
mechanism; it is why answerability is a potential 
dimension of accountability. Without at least the threat 
of public exposure and discomfort, answerability 
would be reduced to a mere ritualistic performance 
rather than an actual dimension of accountability. 
After all, answerability without tangible consequences 
is already a “soft” form of accountability (Fox 2007a). 
Meanwhile, from the point of view of those civic 
actors who are doing the questioning in such settings, 
they may feel like they are doing their utmost to be 
constructive, containing their anger while risking 
criticism from more radical counterparts for being 
overly polite. 
The rather subjective, imprecise and indeed ideological 
character of the term “confrontational” in the TPA field 
indicates that a less charged word would be useful to 
capture societal efforts to speak the truth to power. 
“Adversarial” may be more appropriate to convey 
processes in which societal and state actors clash over 
answerability and enforcement. “Critical engagement” 
is another relevant term.87 Both implicitly recognise 
the legitimacy of open debate and speaking the truth 
to power. They also avoid the implication that such 
debates are necessarily extra-institutional. 
For those interested in analysis that can guide 
accountability strategies, it may be worth recognising 
the potentially “productive” nature of specifically 
adversarial processes, both inside and outside of formal 
institutions. Indeed, many government institutions 
are created precisely in order to regulate and bound 
adversarial processes that are intended to generate 
accountability. Let us start with the rule of law, in 
which court systems and lawsuits (under democracies) 
are intended to produce accountability. In the field of 
open government, consider the agencies created to 
adjudicate citizens’ complaints that their information 
requests have been unjustly rejected by government 
agencies.88 In India, the remarkable official public 
information access system is sometimes perceived 
as adversarial by both advocates and opponents 
of accountability. In the social accountability field, 
consider as well India’s widely recognised social audits, 
which take the form of widely attended public hearings 
in which oral and written testimony can expose 
corruption literally in the presence of the accused – 
a civil society innovation now enshrined in national 
legislation.89 
Formal adversarial accountability claims also play 
a central role in political democracy. Competitive 
elections are the political accountability mechanism 
par excellence, and they are adversarial by definition. 
In a wide range of formal legal and political arenas, 
accountability requires conflict, often within public 
institutions created to adjudicate such conflicts. 
In contrast, the conventional constructive versus 
confrontational dichotomy both denies the legitimacy 
of conflict and ignores its potential contribution to the 
production of accountability. 
Reframing state–society terms of 
engagement: from two-
dimensional to three-dimensional
To sum up, the conventional dichotomy between 
constructive versus confrontational reflects a two-
dimensional understanding of state–society relations. 
The implication is that either societal actors are 
in effect subordinate partners to the state, or they 
directly challenge the state in extra-institutional 
ways considered illegitimate by power-holders, both 
in the state and in international donor agencies. 
The approach proposed here offers a three-
dimensional approach, insofar as societal actors can 
collaborate with some state actors while challenging 
others. Instead of assuming a dichotomy between 
confrontation and collaboration, this approaches 
envisages seeing citizen questioning of authority 
as falling more along a continuum: it can be either 
more or less adversarial, with only an extreme end 
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of the continuum involving actual extra-institutional 
confrontation.
One genre of this three-dimensional approach involves 
sandwich strategies, in which the construction 
of accountability is driven by coalitions of pro-
accountability forces that bridge the state–society 
divide, acting to offset anti-accountability forces that 
are also often embedded both in state and society 
(Fox 2015, 2014, 2007b). In this scenario, pro-
accountability forces in both state and society ally, 
in an effort to isolate and weaken anti-accountability 
forces in both state and society. In this three-
dimensional theory of change, strategic, targeted 
conflict turns out to be necessary to produce 
accountability. Conflict can therefore be constructive.
6. Grounding vertical integration 
in nine cases 
The nine cases discussed in this section were chosen 
because they combine monitoring and advocacy efforts 
across levels of the state, targeting specific national 
policies for public service delivery. These policies all 
directly affect social constituencies that are both potential 
eyes and ears for monitoring, and potential collective 
actors to provide civic muscle to bolster pro-accountability 
reforms. As noted, the rationale for examining three 
cases in each country is intended to illustrate that within 
relatively robust national civil societies, multi-level 
monitoring and advocacy initiatives are not rare. Indeed, 
they respond to activists’ learning by doing. 
The three cases in each country certainly do not 
exhaust each nation’s relevant civil society landscape. 
Probing other issue areas would reveal more multi-level 
initiatives (e.g. water, forest management, extractives, 
etc.), while looking deeper into certain subnational 
territories, where legacies of state–society synergy 
have managed to produce strong public institutions, 
would lead to additional cases (e.g. Kerala). The three 
countries under discussion share a significant degree of 
stateness, insofar as their regimes are stable, political 
leadership is determined by well-institutionalised 
competitive elections (in spite of the persistence 
of vote-buying), and their nation states manage to 
actually govern much of their territory. 
In the context of growing interest in the TPA field 
in addressing the challenges that are specific to 
fragile and conflict settings, one might ask how to 
draw relevant lessons from this selection of country 
experiences. The most general response would be to 
note that the study of the dynamics of existing (or past) 
vertical integration could inform experimentation in 
other settings. Three more precise responses to the 
question of the relevance of these cases to fragile and 
conflict settings are as follows. 
1. Even where national governments appear to have 
a high degree of state capacity, when it comes to 
public accountability and oversight, those specific 
public institutions are often much weaker than the 
rest of the state apparatus. Civil society engagement 
offers one path to strengthen them, and analysis of 
fragile and conflict settings could concentrate on 
identifying such opportunities for triggering virtuous 
circles of mutual empowerment between pro-
accountability actors in state and society. 
2. All three countries include within them significant 
subnational territories that could be considered 
fragile and conflict settings. In all three, the 
legitimacy of the nation state is contested in 
significant subnational territories. 
• India has to deal with partial dual power 
situations in persistently Maoist areas, and it 
does not govern through normal democratic 
institutions in Kashmir. 
• The Philippines contends with both an ongoing 
communist insurgency in some rural areas and 
the Moro autonomy conflict, which is currently 
addressed by a temporary autonomous regional 
governance compromise. Both are the focus of 
political negotiations. 
• The Mexican state is faced with multiple de 
facto dual power situations, as organised crime 
has become a dominant force in several states, 
including the colonisation of the state apparatus 
itself at multiple levels. 
In terms of posing a challenge to the state’s 
monopoly on the use of force, the long-standing 
political stalemate in Chiapas, which involves 
de facto tolerance of indigenous regional self-
governance in Zapatista territory, pales by 
comparison. This shared pattern of incomplete 
territorial governance indicates that one promising 
research strategy for drawing lessons from these 
countries for fragile and conflict settings would 
be to recognise that such situations persist within 
those same countries. A next step would be to 
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explore whether and how existing TPA initiatives 
in those countries either have tried, or could be 
extended, to “reach” those regions where nation-
state governance is incomplete or contested. 
Indeed, some of the vertical integration cases 
outlined here do cover fragile and conflict settings 
(e.g. Chhattisgarh in India, Guerrero in Mexico and 
Mindanao in the Philippines). 
3. The third reason why more in-depth research in 
these cases could be relevant to the analysis of 
accountability initiatives in fragile and conflict 
settings is that citizens take significant risks by 
participating. Recognition of the fear factor is notably 
absent from most research in the TPA field. In India, 
Mexico and the Philippines, grassroots citizen activists 
who engage in policy advocacy and monitoring are 
regularly murdered, as in the notable case of more 
than 50 information requesters in India (Pande 2015, 
based on press reports). Though the perpetrators 
may by non-state actors, they often enjoy the de 
facto protection of the state. Future research on at 
least some of these cases may therefore be relevant 
to inform strategies for addressing the fear factor 
inherent in the decision to exercise rights.
The capsule summaries of each case that follow do 
not do justice to the diversity of issues and actors 
involved; instead, they focus specifically on their multi-
level nature and their combination of monitoring and 
advocacy. Because these cases all serve to illustrate 
empirical examples of the pursuit of synergy illustrated 
conceptually in Figure 1, they warrant much more 
nuanced and in-depth process tracing analysis to 
better understand their strengths and limitations.
Philippines
Textbook Count
The Textbook Count campaign is particularly 
emblematic of vertical integration because its 
coordinated action – between national CSOs, reformists 
in government and broad-based civic organisations – 
made the comprehensive, independent oversight of the 
textbook system possible. CSOs monitored each link in 
the supply chain, including contracting, the quality of 
production, as well as multiple levels of the Department 
of Education’s book distribution process, from districts 
to the vast majority of schools in the country. National 
CSOs collaborated with both the Department of 
Education and broad-based civic organisations whose 
citizen monitors managed to cover between 70–80% of 
the textbook delivery points in the country. Joint CSO–
government problem-solving sessions resolved issues 
identified, and overall corruption was reduced and 
efficiency increased.90
The campaign carried out four rounds of national 
mobilisation under independent CSO coordination 
between 2003 and 2007. Diverse CSOs were closely 
articulated from the local to provincial and national 
levels, in most of the country. However, when CSOs 
handed national coordination to the Department of 
Education, the quality control of third-party monitoring 
was lost and it is not clear to what degree the 
accomplishments survived. Of the many CSO public 
oversight initiatives that flourished during this period, 
few survive, but Textbook Count achieved the broadest 
coverage, in social and territorial terms. 
Reproductive health law
Twelve years of multi-level CSO advocacy in the 
Philippines, together with insider allies, led to 
a landmark reproductive health law in 2012.91 
Coordinated by the Reproductive Health Alliance 
Network, the campaign combined extensive public 
education efforts, diverse bottom-up organising 
initiatives at local and provincial levels, legal strategies 
and participation in “invited spaces”. The campaign 
built momentum for a national law by pursuing a 
multi-level approach, passing pro-family planning to 
local government initiatives (a tactic matched by the 
opposition). The campaign was highly successful at 
winning over public opinion, which helped to counter 
entrenched, multi-level opposition (e.g. from Catholic 
bishops) and win over the president.
Once the law was passed, the campaign focused 
on implementation, which faced both legal 
and bureaucratic hurdles. The law’s national 
implementation team included six elected CSO 
representatives, including Likhaan, the women’s health 
organisation that served as the campaign’s secretariat. 
Before, CSOs had not been included in monitoring 
the government’s health policy. The government’s 
monitoring of the law’s implementation was 
strengthened and broadened with CSO support, though 
it was still constrained by a reliance on data provided 
by relatively autonomous local governments. CSO 
leaders considered this self-reported official data to be 
less reliable than survey-based information. In contrast 
to the campaign’s multi-level advocacy campaign to 
promote the law’s passage, CSOs lacked the technical 
capacity and territorial reach to vet official government 
health data, while the government did not allocate any 
dedicated funding for monitoring and evaluation.92 
Conditional cash transfer programme
Since 2008, Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good 
Government, a provincial civic organisation in the 
northern Philippines, has been monitoring the 
government’s flagship anti-poverty conditional 
programme, known as I-Pantiwid or the 4Ps, which is 
based on cash transfers (Bhargava and Raha 2015; 
CCAGG 2015). This multi-stakeholder initiative involves 
close collaboration between CSOs and both national 
and local government agencies, with media and audit 
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agencies acting as observers. The policy monitoring is 
multi-level insofar as several CSOs collaborate at the 
regional level, while also partnering with community-level 
stakeholders, specifically the “parent leaders”, to train 
them to become advocates for programme beneficiaries. 
CSO monitoring focused primarily on helping the 
programme to meet its goals.93 The monitoring 
initiative was triggered by problems with both inclusion 
and exclusion in the programme, so oversight and 
problem-solving emphasised the inclusion of more 
eligible participants and the removal of ineligible 
subsidy recipients from the roster, as well as improving 
the payment process. The case-based problem-solving 
efforts were multi-level, while monitoring focused on 
the local level, rather than on informing advocacy 
proposals to address possible issues in the upstream 
policy process. CSO monitoring found that the anti-
poverty programme’s mechanism to redress grievances 
was operating, but its wheels turned slowly. CSO 
leaders identified the empowerment of parent leaders 
as one of the monitoring initiative’s main strengths, 
insofar as their oversight efforts began to address 
other government programmes as well.94 
India
Right to information campaign
India’s right to information law earned global 
recognition for both its comprehensive nature and the 
advocacy campaign that made it possible (Sharma, P. 
2015; Sharma, A. 2013; Baviskar 2010; Singh 2007). 
Launched in 1996, the National Campaign for Right to 
Information became a broad-based, multi-level and 
unusually cross-sectoral network that brought together 
grassroots organisations, issue-based campaigns, 
media leaders, lawyers, and extensive networks of 
current and retired senior civil servants. 
The passage of the national law in 2005 was preceded 
by numerous, diverse state-level campaigns, and 
eight of those states passed right-to-information 
laws. Though these state laws tended to be weak, 
they provided a focus for state-level CSO action and 
coalition-building. Indeed, in Rajasthan, the state with 
the most vigorous, agenda-setting grassroots right-to-
information campaign, known as Mazdoor Kisan Shakti 
Sangathan, opposition from state bureaucrats blocked 
the passage of a state law (Pande 2014; Roy and Dey 
2002; Jenkins and Goetz 1999). Yet the grassroots 
and state-level organisation energised the national 
advocacy work to raise the bar with a comprehensive 
federal law, and campaigners’ access to a victorious 
centre-left national electoral coalition helped to tip the 
balance.
Once the national law was passed, advocates used 
direct-action protests to block efforts by senior 
bureaucrats to water down the law, followed by 
public awareness campaigns and monitoring and 
advocacy to promote its implementation. Monitoring 
capacity varies widely across India’s states, but 
the challenges of implementing the law have been 
monitored regularly from a national perspective (RaaG 
2014, 2009). Persistent issues include the weakness 
of appeals mechanisms at state and federal levels, 
limited proactive disclosure by government agencies, 
and violent reprisals against information requesters, 
especially grassroots leaders of campaigns to resist 
displacement (Pande 2015).
Right to food campaign
The Indian state carries out numerous food-related 
social programmes, but in much of the country the 
institutions for public oversight are weak. Diverse 
civil society advocacy, monitoring and legal rights 
initiatives have long attempted to improve policy 
implementation, and they came together to support 
public interest litigation, an action commonly known 
as the right to food campaign, which began in 2001. 
This national campaign involves state-level actors with 
links to grassroots organisations, while the involvement 
of the Supreme Court has led to the appointment of 
commissioners who have become allies for national 
and state-level advocates. The federal government’s 
passage of a new food security law in 2013 created 
a framework that encouraged CSO advocates to 
work with state governments to contain leakage of 
resources and improve pro-poor targeting, with some 
notable progress so far.95 These reforms of anti-poverty 
programmes via institutional change are currently 
in open political competition with tech-led targeting 
initiatives, such as the Aadhaar biometric card.96
State governments are mandated to monitor the 
implementation of public distribution systems, through 
inspectors, hotlines, and ICT and phone reporting 
tools, but their efforts have been very uneven.97 CSO 
monitoring has concentrated on India’s primary food 
security programme, the Public Distribution System, 
addressing local diversion from retail outlets (selling 
subsidised food to non-poor people) or occasional 
larger scandals. Grassroots public hearings, pioneered 
with the right to information movement, also serve to 
expose accountability failures at food shops, but without 
the systematic monitoring of upstream leakages. 
Increasingly, action-researchers are using consumer 
surveys to assess the public distribution system’s 
performance. The uneven performance of the system 
appears to be related, at least in part, to variation 
in distribution channels. Some states rely on private 
sector shops, which have a strong incentive to divert 
subsidised food to better-off customers who can pay 
the full price. Other states market the subsidised 
food through shops managed by local governments 
and social organisations, which are more likely to be 
accountable to low-income consumers.
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Community monitoring in the National Rural 
Health Mission
Like the right-to-information and food campaigns, the 
inclusion of officially recognised community monitoring 
in the National Rural Health Mission is a government 
programme created in response to a multi-level 
advocacy coalition – the People’s Health Movement 
– that reaches across many Indian states. Unlike the 
previous case studies, the National Rural Health Mission 
is a national programme rather than a law. Launched 
in nine states, it promotes partnerships between health 
service providers, citizens, local governments and civic 
organisations, including an official national oversight 
committee, the Advisory Group on Community 
Action, that includes CSO participation. This process 
emphasises partnerships with state-level CSOs and 
governments, supporting village health committees, 
developing monitoring methods for village-level health 
report cards, and promoting a repertoire of grassroots 
public dialogues and hearings to disseminate and 
address monitoring findings.98 
The community-based monitoring (CBM) process 
was launched in nine Indian states in 2007, and 
has continued with successive expansions in the 
state of Maharashtra. The CSO SATHI, together 
with the state government and 50 partners, has 
coordinated intensive community monitoring, which 
now covers over 800 villages.99 In addition, 405 public 
dialogues between 2007 and 2014 encouraged local 
governments to focus more, and service providers 
improved the construction and maintenance of 
facilities while beginning to offer mandated laboratory 
and indoor services. Structural problems persisted, 
such as understaffing and problems with using 
tied funds for outreach. State-level authorities 
were relatively more supportive of locally focused 
accountability efforts compared to middle-level health 
system managers. 
Some aspects of health-provider functioning have 
significantly improved in CBM areas, such as stopping 
illegal fees, more regular staff attendance, improved 
behaviour towards patients and public display of 
information, such issues being labelled “CBM-
sensitive”.100 The CBM process also identified some 
problems as “CBM-resistant” and pursued “creative 
conflict” and “people reclaiming health services” 
approaches.101 
The broader health policy context currently appears 
unfavourable, with low spending and staff shortages 
for public services, which leads some to conclude 
that the government might instead favour private 
health provision. Though its future is uncertain, this 
CBM process in Maharashtra is still one of the largest 
and most comprehensive multi-level coordination 
monitoring and advocacy initiatives focused specifically 
on health policy in India.102 
Mexico
Community food councils
This longstanding, national-level, rural food marketing 
programme encouraged citizen oversight at both 
community and regional levels, and is therefore an 
example of partial integration of citizen oversight. The 
programme was launched in 1979 and still delivers 
staple foods to more than 27,000 village stores, which 
are supplied by 300 warehouses. The architects of this 
social accountability process created multi-level invited 
spaces, and some became autonomous claimed spaces 
in practice.103 Elected village committees – known as 
community food councils – oversaw the management 
of the local stores, but what made the programme 
design especially distinctive was that those committees 
were represented on the elected regional warehouse 
oversight councils. 
The regional warehouse oversight councils had an anti-
corruption mission: to ensure that the subsidised staple 
food was delivered from the warehouses to remote 
villages. They were also nominally networked at state 
and national levels, but the councils only exercised 
sufficient autonomy to play an oversight role at the 
regional level. 
Community food council leaders faced the challenge 
of fending off attempts by the ruling party to use the 
programme for political control: a persistent problem 
in Mexico. The councils’ approach to anti-corruption 
was primarily preventative, since they had little formal 
recourse when food supplies were diverted. Reformist 
national policy-makers in charge of the programme 
knew that if this oversight system was to work, the 
regional warehouse oversight councils had to be 
autonomous from the bureaucracy, the ruling party and 
local elites; this led them to recruit hundreds of non-
partisan community organisers to create regional free 
spaces that allowed village representatives to exercise 
freedom of association and expression.104 
This approach set a precedent back in the early 1980s, 
when Mexico was under an authoritarian one-party 
political system. About one third of these regional councils 
managed to act as autonomous countervailing powers, 
according to field research carried out in 1985–1986 and 
again in 2005–2006 (Fox 2007b, 1992b). By the late 
1990s, networks of regional food councils had gained 
sufficient national clout to roll back an attempt by national 
technocrats to dismantle the programme, briefly reaching 
full vertical integration of policy oversight and advocacy. 
By 2016, however, few autonomous councils had survived 
the many years of a hostile policy environment, combined 
with the lack of allies in both state and society.105
Maternal Mortality Observatory
Mexican civil society actors have been undertaking 
policy monitoring and advocacy work to reduce 
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maternal mortality for more than 25 years.106 In one 
example, CSOs, academics, women’s organisations, 
international agencies and government officials 
partnered in the multi-stakeholder Committee to 
Promote Safe Motherhood to discuss trends, causes, 
consequences and strategies. Behind Mexico’s national 
average for maternal mortality are high degrees of 
social and territorial inequality, so this effort focused 
on health services for indigenous women in the 
southern states of Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca. 
Two autonomous federal agencies – the National 
Women’s Institute and the National Commission for 
Evaluation of Social Policy – were especially supportive, 
requesting joint health policy evaluations.107 The 
national multi-stakeholder network helped to create 
space for state-level CSOs and researchers to 
encourage agreements with state health authorities, 
which are primarily responsible for service delivery.108 
This collaborative problem-solving campaign then 
bolstered its capacity for autonomous monitoring by 
launching the Maternal Mortality Observatory, with 
technical support from the United Nations and the 
Pan American Health Organization. Non-governmental 
participants valued its technical independence from 
governmental data sources.
Monitoring goals included tracking national trends, 
highlighting good practices for mortality reduction 
and documenting whether government agencies meet 
their commitments. The Maternal Mortality Observatory 
began monitoring the government’s key maternal 
and perinatal health program in 2011. It discovered 
that funding earmarked to support specific mortality 
prevention programmes disappeared when the funds 
reached state governments. They also learned that state 
government health staff did not know the procedures 
for spending resources appropriately, in part because 
of high staff turnover. The Observatory also detailed 
problems with federal-to-state disbursement processes. 
The multi-stakeholder problem-solving process 
persuaded health authorities to respond to these 
issues. In spite of the risk of violent reprisals, 
independent state- and municipal-level monitoring of 
health policy implementation also revealed extensive 
corruption, though their reports appear to have been 
ignored by authorities.109 In 2015, the Observatory’s 
evidence informed a new law that mandated health 
services to strengthen their emergency obstetric 
services (Argüello 2016). It now monitors the 
implementation of this new policy, which is a key 
indicator of implementation of broader reforms that 
promise the “universalisation” of health services.
Family planning budgets 
Mexico’s advocacy campaigners for reproductive 
rights won a significant victory when, in 2011, the 
government launched a plan to address teenage 
pregnancy that included a specific budget earmarked 
for adolescent sexual and reproductive health. 
In order to identify possible implementation 
bottlenecks, one of the participants in the CSO 
advocacy coalition – the Mexican Family Planning 
Foundation, an affiliate of International Planned 
Parenthood Federation – launched a public budget-
monitoring initiative in 2010 that including the 
tracking of state governments’ implementation of the 
federal policy. 
The Foundation spent three years learning to use 
the government’s public information request system 
to track both budget allocations and spending in 
the states with the highest teenage pregnancy 
rates. It found that federal funds often did not reach 
the states in time to be spent during the annual 
budget cycle, so that much of the funding was 
either spent inappropriately or had to be returned. 
Also, contraceptive stock-outs were pervasive. This 
multi-level monitoring informed the Foundation’s 
problem-solving advocacy at the federal level, which 
led to two key policy changes after seven years: the 
disbursement of programme funds much earlier in the 
budget year, and central government procurement of 
contraceptive purchases (Delgado 2016).110 This case 
shows that technical budget analysis can identify subtle 
institutional weaknesses, which can be addressed with 
external oversight when entrenched vested interests are 
not directly involved.
Comparative reflections
These summaries indicate that participatory 
accountability initiatives that both work across scale 
and seek synergy between monitoring and advocacy 
are not rare. Future research that looks across issue 
silos through the lens of scale is likely to discover 
numerous other relevant, comparable cases. A larger 
base of documented cases of scale shift and vertical 
integration would serve as a basis for much more 
systematic comparative analysis, which may in turn 
generate more fine-tuned research hypotheses suitable 
for more rigorous testing.
These nine cases include diverse patterns of state–
society engagement, all within the broad category 
of critical collaboration (see Table 1). Most involve 
multi-stakeholder initiatives that cut across the 
state–society divide; the only case that was purely 
government-led (Mexico’s community food councils) 
dated from decades before such partnerships became 
a central part of the governance reform repertoire. 
Most of the nine cases involved multiple levels (at 
least more than two) of coordinated monitoring and 
advocacy, though only one (Textbook Count) involved 
“full CSO coverage” of an entire policy supply chain. 
The cases also varied widely in terms of their approach 
to citizen voice, ranging from seeking broad policy 
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change to more narrow problem-solving limited to 
addressing specific implementation problems (see 
Table 2). While the closest to a “paradigm case” of 
vertical integration – Textbook Count – involved a 
clear division of labour between national advocacy / 
problem-solving and local citizen voice largely limited 
to monitoring, most of the initiatives summarised here 
avoided that dichotomy. 
Table 1 Patterns of CSO–government engagement in multi-level monitoring and advocacy cases
Monitoring Advocacy / problem-solving
Local / subnational 
level 
National level 
(government-led 
or CSO-led)
Local / subnational 
level (breadth of 
coverage)
National level 
(government-led, 
or CSO-led)
Philippines
Textbook Count CSO-led Government–CSO 
partnership; invited 
space
Government–CSO 
partnership; invited 
space
Reproductive 
health law 
CSO-led CSO role in 
government-invited 
space to monitor 
implementation
CSO-led CSO-led advocacy 
for new law, with 
legislative allies; 
claimed space
Conditional cash 
transfer 
programme
CSO-led, in 
partnership with 
local government
Invited space with 
CSO participation
CSO-led Invited space with 
CSO participation; 
invited space
India
Right to 
information 
campaign
CSO-led CSO-led CSO-led CSO-led; claimed 
space
Right to food 
campaign
Some CSO-led, 
some state-led
CSO-led, with 
litigation allies
CSO-led advocacy; 
state-led problem-
solving
CSO-led, reinforced 
by Supreme Court 
decision; claimed 
space
National Rural 
Health Mission
CSO–state 
government 
partnership
CSO–health 
programme 
advisory committee
CSO–state 
government 
partnership
Government-led, 
CSO invited space
Mexico
Community food 
councils
Government-
sponsored; council-
led; invited space
Government- 
sponsored national 
committee of 
councils; invited 
space
Autonomous 
council-led; invited 
spaces once 
claimed
No autonomous 
national 
coordination 
Maternal Mortality 
Observatory
CSO-led; 
government 
participation
CSO-led; government 
participation; joint 
evaluations in 
invited spaces
CSO-led; 
government 
participation
CSO-led, with 
government 
participation
Family planning 
budgets
CSO-led CSO-led CSO-led CSO-led
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Table 2 Mapping the geographic reach of multi-level monitoring and advocacy cases
Multi-level CSO policy oversight
Monitoring Advocacy / 
problem-solving
Local / 
subnational
National Local / 
subnational 
(breadth of 
coverage)
National Subnational presence of citizen 
oversight efforts 
Philippines
Textbook Count 
X X X X
Up to 80% of delivery points
Reproductive health 
law X X X X
Very broad during advocacy for 
the law
Conditional cash 
transfer 
programme X X
Abra province and Northern 
Luzon region
India
Right to information 
campaign
X X X X
Assam, Bihar, Delhi, Goa, Gujarat, 
Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, 
Maharashtra, Manipur, 
Meghalaya, Rajasthan, Tamil 
Nadu, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh
Right to food 
campaign
X X X
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, 
Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Gujarat, 
Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, 
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Meghalaya, Orissa, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal 
National Rural 
Health Mission X X X X
Maharashtra
Mexico
Community food 
councils X X
One third of councils nationwide 
in low-income rural areas; 
1980–2006 (approximately)
Maternal Mortality 
Observatory X X X X
States of Chiapas, Guerrero and 
Oaxaca; federal level
Family planning 
budgets X X X X
State of Queretaro; federal level
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7. Looking forward: concluding 
questions
Looking ahead, this discussion of the research 
challenges involved in multi-level CSO monitoring and 
advocacy initiatives suggests some broad directions for 
future analysis. The first involves more systematic case 
documentation, to broaden and deepen the evidence 
base needed for more robust analysis of the dynamics 
and impact of multi-level monitoring and advocacy. 
This would involve follow-up on the previous empirical 
discussion, which offered nine examples of relevant 
cases and began to review the broader patterns that 
emerged. The next agenda-setting challenge will be 
explored in this concluding section, through three 
analytical questions that have yet to receive significant 
attention. Finally, the annex proposes a series of more 
focused preliminary hypotheses, in order to stimulate 
discussion about how researchers might go about 
applying more systematic empirical tests of this paper’s 
core propositions.
If scale shift matters, then how 
and why does it happen? 
In the context of this discussion, scale shift includes 
both transitions to multi-level CSO links and the 
broadening of the territorial reach of citizen-led 
monitoring and advocacy. If scale shift looks especially 
promising, then how are the opportunities and 
constraints perceived by relevant actors? Looking 
from the bottom up, how and why do socially 
grounded civic initiatives spread from 10 to 50 to 500 
communities? How can this process avoid the traps 
that have held back previous top-down efforts to scale 
up participatory approaches, such as bureaucratic 
neutering (Blackburn with Holland 1998) or elite 
capture (Mansuri and Rao 2013)? How do those 
communities, in turn, project oversight capacity and 
the power to advocate for themselves upstream in the 
policy process? This involves building the capacity to 
aggregate voice, to engage in collective action at scale, 
and to construct representative organisations that 
embody both legitimacy and authenticity. 
In contrast, looking from the national level towards 
the subnational and local, how do campaigns led 
from the capital sink roots more broadly and deeply 
within existing, organised civil society that is closer 
to the ground? This often involves cross-sectoral 
coalition-building, which is not often treated as a focus 
of research. Moreover, campaigns often shift scale in 
response to changing opportunities and constraints at 
different levels of the state, which are caused by the 
changing balance of forces in the political system (e.g. 
Pande 2016). In the process, how do policy advocacy 
campaigns collaborate with some levels and branches 
of the state, while also challenging others? Cutting 
across these processes is the question of how ICT can 
play the role of enabler and accelerant (most of the 
cases summarised in Section 6 used, at most, mobile 
phones).
Which analytical findings from the 
broader social science literature on 
collective action are relevant for 
understanding the citizen-action 
process in the field of transparency, 
participation and accountability?
In the past decade, the literature on TPA has come 
a long way towards bringing citizen action closer to 
the top of the agenda.111 Yet research in this field has 
only just begun to tap into relevant insights from the 
vast, pre-existing, multi-disciplinary social science 
literature that has been addressing the motivations, 
repertoires and impacts of collective action since 
at least the 1970s. This literature suggests that 
enabling factors – such as political opportunity 
structures, pre-existing social networks, bridge-
building interlocutors, the framing of causes in the 
eyes of public opinion, and processes of collective 
identity formation and political culture-making – will 
be especially relevant for understanding how pro-
accountability actors can broaden both their social 
inclusion and territorial reach.
How can the black box of the state 
be unpacked to determine the mix 
of incentives and motivations that 
influences whether and how state 
actors respond to citizen voice? 
How can voice trigger “teeth”? The social science 
literature’s response to the question of when citizen 
action leads to pro-accountability institutional 
responses is limited by its bifurcation into the study of 
the policy process on the one hand, and citizen action 
on the other (with the notable exception of key works in 
the social movement literature). Much of the literature 
on TPA interventions tends to rely on deductive 
assumptions to impute the motivations of public sector 
workers and their managers, rather than treating 
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motivations as a focus for research. The experimental 
literature, in particular, tends to treat frontline public 
sector workers as a homogeneous but unopened black 
box and then attempts to influence their behaviour 
based on combinations of external carrots and sticks.112
If one goal of accountability-building is to influence 
the behaviour of front-line service providers, then 
research that documents – rather than assumes – what 
motivates them would be very useful. Institutional 
ethnography can reveal both what goes on inside the 
state and the dynamics of state–society interfaces, and 
therefore has great potential to reveal both obstacles 
and opportunities for change. For example, there are 
many possible explanations for staff absenteeism; 
which ones hold, and in which contexts? This kind of 
research could inform testable hypotheses involving 
both institutional changes and alternative incentives.
Another promising line of research addresses the dual 
roles of (some) lower- and lower-middle-level state 
officials as both functionaries and citizens, as well 
as broader processes in which civic engagement can 
empower and enable those functionaries who want to 
be public servants. In some times and places, public 
sector workers consider themselves to be citizens as 
well, and have a stake in improving public services 
(e.g. Abers and Keck 2009). What difference could a 
sense of mission, professionalisation and esprit de 
corps make? Existing, innovative institutional political 
economy research on these issues, involving front-line 
public sector workers, has received remarkably little 
follow-up (e.g. Tendler 1997). What are the conditions 
under which their roles can be transformed from the 
last cog in a bureaucratic machine into responsible 
service providers?113
To sum up, the vertical integration proposition suggests 
new empirical and analytical agendas, which will 
hopefully contribute to the broader reboot that the TPA 
field needs to inform more effective strategies.
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Annex 1. A menu of testable 
hypotheses for discussion
These research questions and propositions focus 
on dynamics and pathways of change. This leads to 
a central concern for measuring and explaining the 
inherent variation in patterns of citizen action and 
institutional change, across societies, territories and 
states. These questions lead directly to questions 
about appropriate indicators of change. Such indicators 
can be both quantitative and qualitative, and with 
a sufficiently large number of respondents / cases, 
qualitative data can be translated into quantitative 
data. 
The two analytical methods that appear to be most 
promising for these questions are the subnational 
comparative method (Snyder 2001) and process 
tracing (Punton and Welle 2015; Collier 2011). 
These two approaches for identifying causal patterns 
are distinct, yet highly complementary. All of the 
hypotheses outlined here involve the subnational 
comparative method, thereby holding the national 
political context constant. Cross-national comparison 
is less compelling, because extreme variation in the 
national context would weaken the analytical leverage 
of the comparative method.
This approach is not framed primarily in terms of the 
conventional “what works” question. It has several 
implications that may complicate a focus on the 
dynamics and pathways towards change. 
• First, the phrasing of the question implies that 
the answer takes the form of “yes or no” when, in 
practice, progress towards accountability is likely 
to be uneven and incomplete. When breaking out of 
low accountability traps, achieving partial change in 
a minority of subnational territories may constitute 
a huge breakthrough, even though the initiative did 
not work in most of the countries. In this scenario, 
seeking a yes or no answer for whether an initiative 
works could render significant progress invisible. 
• Second, embedded in the question is the 
implication that there is a clearly bounded “it” (read 
“intervention”) that either works or does not work, 
which reinforces the yes or no subtext. 
• Third, the question implies that there is one clear, 
objective measure of success. Yet the definition of 
pro-accountability may be contested, with answers 
varying depending on the positionality of each 
stakeholder. For example, advocacy campaigners 
in a capital city may be very pleased with major 
media coverage of their cause, which could build 
political momentum towards future policy changes, 
while citizens outside of the capital, who are directly 
affected by past accountability failures, may see no 
benefit at all. 
• Fourth, the what works question can imply a 
relatively short time horizon, as is characterised by 
numerous semi-experimental interventions. This 
may obscure the possibility of discontinuous change 
in the medium term. 
Insofar as the research agenda on multi-level 
monitoring and advocacy initiatives is still incipient, 
the implication is that a focus on more basic “what 
happened and why” should guide the documentation 
and analysis of a much wider range of cases, to inform 
more systematic, deductive hypothesis-testing in the 
future, once a broader empirical foundation has been 
built. That said, the research behind the nine case study 
summaries introduced in this paper suggest a series 
of potentially testable hypotheses, with a focus on civil 
society engagement for public sector accountability. 
To avoid a tool-led approach to research strategy, the 
definition of specific indicators of action repertoires and 
institutional change will await feedback on the overall 
agenda and the specific questions proposed (e.g. 
what specific combinations of tactics and strategies 
may provide greater leverage). Another notable gap 
in this menu of deductive approaches is that it does 
not address how multi-level initiatives are constructed, 
though challenges to coalition-building across levels 
and sectors have been broadly addressed in previous 
work (Fox and Aceron 2016; Fox 2010).
Menu of options: questions and 
hypotheses 
Q1) What difference does vertical integration make?
H1) CSO policy monitoring and advocacy that 
addresses more than one level or stage of the 
policy process can leverage more improvements in 
public service delivery than exclusively local and / 
or exclusively national citizen monitoring and policy 
dialogue.
Method: Compare multi-level with locally bounded 
monitoring and exclusively national initiatives, 
focused on the same accountability failures in similar 
constituencies in the same country.
Potential problem: Multi-level initiatives may not be 
comparable to locally bounded initiatives; they may 
be the product of more influential CSO coalitions, 
which would over-determine the institutional impact.
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Q2) Multi-level civic or social monitoring and 
advocacy initiatives may or may not partner with 
counterparts within the state. Can hybrid state–
society coalitions drive sandwich strategies that 
strengthen pro-accountability actors?
H2) Multi-level civic or social monitoring and advocacy 
initiatives that partner with pro-accountability actors 
within the state can generate more institutional 
responsiveness than civil society initiatives that lack 
such partnerships.
Method: Hold multi-level monitoring and advocacy 
campaigns that broadly share change goals 
constant, and compare those with and without 
collaborative coalition for change, either in different 
subnational territories, across issue areas, or both.
Potential problem: One reason why otherwise 
comparable accountability initiatives lack coalitions 
with pro-accountability state counterparts may be 
that such potential partners do not exist, or lack 
influence in their respective subnational territories 
or issue areas.
Q2.1) Can partnerships with public oversight 
agencies bolster the leverage of vertical integration 
initiatives?
H2.1) Multi-level monitoring and advocacy that 
partners with governmental oversight agencies can 
trigger mutual empowerment and leverage more 
answerability from public sector agencies than 
initiatives that do not engage with these oversight 
agencies.
Method: Compare multi-level CSO initiatives, with 
and without partnerships, with ombuds agencies, 
audit bureaus, human rights commissions and 
legislative oversight, and assess the impact of public 
oversight agencies on the rest of the state.
Potential problem: Some public oversight agencies 
may be captured by vested interests, and therefore 
unwilling to partner with CSOs to hold other parts of 
the state accountable.
Q3) Can large international donors bolster multi-level 
CSO monitoring and advocacy initiatives?
H3.1) External actors provide more added value when 
they target accountability initiatives that focus on 
specific sectors, and where both public sector and civil 
society actors are aligned.
Method: Compare external pro-accountability 
initiatives in sectors with and without consolidated 
state–society collaborative coalitions for change. 
Focus specifically on the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) and / or World 
Bank citizen engagement projects.
H3.2) External actors provide more added value when 
they target accountability initiatives that focus on 
specific subnational territories, where both public 
sector and civil society actors are aligned.
Method: Compare external pro-accountability 
initiatives in regions with and without consolidated 
state–society collaborative coalitions for change. 
Focus specifically on DFID and / or World Bank 
citizen engagement projects.
Potential problem: International donors may have 
already prioritised sectors or regions with alignment 
between state–society coalitions for change, which 
may rule out null cases for comparison
Q4) What are the entry points to begin to bolster 
multi-level monitoring and advocacy initiatives in 
fragile / conflict settings? Would bolstering local–
subnational links be most promising, or local–national 
links, or subnational–national links?
H4.1) In fragile / conflict settings, to expand the 
breadth and depth of vertically integrated initiatives 
in contexts with low stateness is to strengthen CSO 
capacity to link local- and subnational-level oversight.
H4.2) To expand the breadth and depth of vertically 
integrated initiatives in contexts with low stateness is 
to strengthen CSO capacity to link local- and national-
level oversight.
H4.3) To expand the breadth and depth of vertically 
integrated initiatives in contexts with low stateness is to 
strengthen CSO capacity to links between subnational- 
and national-level oversight.
Method: Attempt each of these three approaches, in 
the same country, in the same issue area, in different 
subnational territories.
Potential problem: This approach leans more towards 
an intervention than a campaign approach, which 
– if organic – would pursue an adaptive learning 
approach to determine which kinds of links are most 
important to strengthen.
Q5) How can international donor assistance in pro-
accountable governance reform be more effective?
H5) International donor assistance to organic, bottom-
up accountability campaigns will leverage greater 
institutional change than donor interventions that lack 
locally grounded, subnational counterparts.
Method: Here, a cross-national comparison is more 
viable. Compare donor investments in governance 
reforms in settings with and without CSO 
accountability campaigns. Consider controlling for 
issue area or scale of investment.
Potential problem: The very existence of 
accountability campaigns might indicate that 
conditions are already more favourable than in other 
settings, where “civil society failure” would support 
the case for more of an interventionist approach.
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Q6) What role does ICT play in improving vertical 
integration strategies?
H6) Multi-level monitoring and advocacy strategies that 
use ICT tools to provide open government feedback 
about the performance of target agencies (e.g. citizen 
feedback portals, proactive disclosure of relevant and 
actionable official data, etc.) are more likely to leverage 
more / faster improvements in service delivery than 
similar multi-level initiatives that share information 
solely through more conventional means (e.g. 
community meetings, letter-writing campaigns, paper-
based monitoring, etc.).
Method: Compare accountability initiatives that do 
and do not use ICT for open government / proactive 
disclosure about agency performance, both within 
and across issue areas and subnational territories.
Potential problem: The capacity of an accountability 
initiative to use strategically deploy ICT and 
proactive disclosure may be an indicator of greater 
underlying institutional capacity and political clout; 
this would complicate efforts to determine the 
specific value added of the ICT / open government 
dimension.
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Endnotes
1 For almost a decade, this field has been called 
transparency and accountability, or T&A. Some working 
in this field recognise the role of participation explicitly 
with the acronym TAP, but the sequence embedded in TAP 
implies that participation follows accountability, whereas 
the primary theory of change suggests that transparency 
informs participation, which in turn enables accountability. 
Recently, some large donors are more explicitly recognising 
the key role of citizen participation, as in the case of the 
large-scale Empowerment and Accountability Research 
Programme supported by UK aid from the UK government, 
and the Hewlett Foundation’s new Global Development 
programme strategy (http://hewlett.org/programs/
global-development-and-population/amplifying-voices/
transparency-participation-and-accountability). 
2 This working paper focuses primarily on the first of 
these two dimensions – the multi-level links – and it will 
conclude by identifying the dynamics of expanding the 
horizontal territorial reach of pro-accountability social 
and civic actors as a major gap in the field. To preview 
this recommendation, and to understand these processes 
of diffusion and replication, the TPA field should draw 
much more systematically on both the scholarly and the 
practitioner literatures on social movements, with examples 
cited throughout this paper.
3 This paragraph and the next draw from Fox (2016).
4 Vertical integration can be an organisational strategy, a 
goal for coalitions or a tool for analysis (Fox and Halloran 
2016; Fox 2001).
5 Consider the different between “opaque” and “clear” 
transparency (Fox 2007a). Clear transparency makes 
accessible information that is relevant to citizens, for 
example about who gets what and how the powerful make 
decisions, both of which are key for information to be 
actionable for citizens. In contrast, opaque transparency 
discloses official data that is either unreliable, incomplete, 
difficult to access or process, and / or irrelevant to inform 
citizen action. Note as well that the “right to know’ is a 
broader concept of transparency, insofar as it is often 
limited to data that the government decides to collect. 
For more on what is involved in citizen perceptions of the 
accessibility and relevance of information, embodied in the 
concept of targeted transparency, see Fung et al (2007).
6 For example, while the Open Government Partnership 
has grown to 70 member countries from its original eight 
in 2011, the Independent Reporting Mechanism’s review 
of the founding countries’ second National Action Plans 
indicates that from the total of 185 commitments, only 11 
are potentially transformational, and of those only nine 
made substantial progress in implementation (author’s data 
analysis). Indeed, AidData’s recent study of international 
efforts to promote institutional change underscored the 
capacity of vested interests to resist change (Parks, Rice 
and Custer 2015). As a result, the transparency field’s 
vocabulary now includes “open-washing” – governmental 
use of open government measures to distract from persistent 
accountability failures. For the first scholarly work to define 
and document open-washing, see Brockmyer (2016).
7 This new World Bank study, in effect, turns the agenda-
setting 2004 World Development Report on its head. 
Recall that the 2004 World Development Report famously 
emphasised the “short route” of citizen voice to influence 
service delivery directly at the state–society interface. This 
was based on the proposition that the “long route” of citizen 
voice expressed through political representation, which is in 
principle supposed to govern public administration, is too 
messy, with too many bottlenecks in a long causal chain. 
In contrast, the 2016 World Development Report makes 
a strong case that, without addressing the long route to 
accountability, the short route won’t get very far (World 
Bank 2016b). The 2016 report also goes beyond political 
accountability to focus more broadly on the importance 
of strategies for using information to encourage more 
evidence-based citizen action, to incentivise better policies 
more generally. For a recent practitioner-oriented analysis 
that makes a parallel argument about the central role of 
electoral engagement, see NDI (2016).
8 If one looks beyond formal evidence reviews, one striking 
example is the current situation in Mexico, which combines 
one of the most robust public information access systems in 
the world with obvious, persistent and systemic accountability 
failures. For another notable national example, long-standing 
participant-observers in the TPA field have been puzzling 
over the significance of Brazil’s recent political crisis. This is 
the country with perhaps the longest-standing, most broad-
based and deeply rooted set of participatory democracy and 
public oversight innovations, especially at the municipal level 
and covering multiple issue areas, yet it turned out that these 
breakthroughs coexisted with more than a decade of systemic 
political corruption at the national level. The disconnect 
between participatory innovations and systemic impunity was 
not limited to the national government; state and municipal 
police also retained impunity for violence against young 
Afro-Brazilian men, resulting in more murders by police than 
during the dictatorship (e.g. Ahnen 2007). 
9 This proposition underscores a classic distinction, made 
earlier by Joshi and Houtzager (2012), between “widgets” 
and “watchdogs”.
10 One problem with this metaphor – which is often 
used to claim that rights violations or accountability 
problems are the exception rather than the rule, and 
therefore not systemic – is that there is powerful counter-
metaphor: “a few bad apples can spoil the whole barrel”. 
Commentator John Oliver makes this argument about the 
power of impunity in his video report on the lack of police 
accountability in the USA, made on 2 October 2016. See: 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=zaD84DTGULo
11 Thanks to Rosie McGee of Making All Voices Count for 
encouragement to make this point more explicit.
12 This is the conclusion of Chayes’ compelling analysis 
(2015) of “acute kleptocracies” and what she calls the 
vertical integration of power elites across scale. She 
demonstrates links between corruption, impunity and the 
abuse of citizens at the local level, and national political 
elites whose model of governance is based on a system-
wide network of upwards resource extraction. 
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13 See: http://doingdevelopmentdifferently.com  
14 Relevant metaphors include Jiu-Jitsu, as well as the David 
and Goliath story. One could read both Gladwell (2013) and 
Ganz (2009) as interpreting David as using a strategy that 
combined various tactics that played to his strengths, while 
effectively exploiting Goliath’s weaknesses. 
15 For example, the strategy of activating and empowering 
public accountability agencies involves audit bureaus, 
human rights commissions, ombuds agencies, legislative 
oversight committees, etc. See, for example, Cornejo, Lavin 
and Mendiburu (2015a, 2015b); Cornejo, Guillán Montero 
and Lavin (2013); and Effective Institutions Platform (2014). 
Another promising set of strategically relevant issues that 
has not been studied in depth in the TPA context involves 
the incentives and motivations that influence policy-makers, 
programme managers and frontline service providers. In 
addition, more research attention should focus on how 
both media strategies and citizen action can influence 
public opinion to more effectively expose and delegitimate 
anti-accountability forces, while activating broader pro-
accountability constituencies.
16 The abbreviation CSO, which refers to civil society 
organisations, is intended to go beyond conventional 
understandings of professionalised NGOs to include the 
full range of formal associations in a given socio-cultural 
context. This is not intended to be a synonym for social 
movements, which usually include CSOs but often are 
grounded more broadly in informal associations. The 
focus here is on CSOs, because the focus on coordinated 
monitoring and advocacy suggests some degree of formal 
organisation, cross-sector coalition-building and capacity 
for deliberative strategising, in contrast to more ephemeral 
genres of protest and dissent.
17 In spite of its wide and intuitive usage, the term 
“campaign” is conceptually underdeveloped, at least in 
the TPA field. The term is used here more broadly than in 
its conventional application to specific units within large 
international NGOs, where campaigns may be given a 
predetermined time frame, after which the glass is found 
to be half full, victory is declared and it is time to move 
on to the next campaign. For analyses of national change 
campaigns in the global South, see Brown and Fox (1998), 
Dalton (2007) and Gaventa and McGee (2010), among 
others. 
18 Among the many independent election oversight 
campaigns around the world, few have pursued “crossover” 
to broaden their agenda to address accountability failures 
in other governance arenas, such as development policy. 
Exceptions include National Citizens’ Movement for Free 
Elections in the Philippines, which joined in a textbook 
monitoring coalition and monitored pharmaceutical 
procurement. Research on accountability and development 
has not yet addressed the relevant lessons from electoral 
oversight experiences. 
19 Note: vertical integration and multi-level will be used as 
synonyms.
20 For extensive treatment of social accountability in fragile 
settings, see Grandvoinnet, Aslam and Raha (2015).
21 Thanks to Brendan Halloran of the International Budget 
Partnership for pointing this out.
22 This discussion of scale will not address the notion of time 
as a scale. However, this will be crucial for addressing both 
transitions toward strategic approaches and discontinuous 
institutional change (e.g. Woolcock 2013). Thanks to 
Duncan Edwards of Making All Voices Count for pointing out 
this gap.
23 Thanks to Michael Fox for this observation.
24 A prominent collection of development donor-oriented 
essays on scaling up focuses heavily on private sector 
business models, limiting the recognition of the differences 
with public goods provision to the question of financing, 
and whether they require subsidies to “prime the pump” 
(Chandy et al 2013). 
25 In the Philippines, Francis Isaac is currently working with 
the Accountability Research Center on a study that broadens 
the multi-level frame to include the role of diverse non-state 
actors at each level, using the case of the Bondoc peninsula 
agrarian reform campaign.
26 Power is an inherently relational concept, with multiple 
dimensions. “Power shift” refers here to changes in the 
balance and distribution of power between actors. This is 
not a zero-sum relationship, insofar as strong (responsive) 
states need strong societies. The literature on power 
analysis is central to understanding possible pathways 
from empowerment to accountability. The distinctions 
between invisible, hidden and visible power are crucial for 
understanding how disparate, subordinated individuals 
can overcome diverse obstacles to collective action. The 
emphasis in this paper is on social and civic actors who 
have already overcome obstacles to invisible power, but 
more focus on that process is necessary to understand 
the drivers of what is called here the “expanded territorial 
reach” of social and civic actors involved in policy advocacy 
and monitoring. For notable examples of analysis of cases 
that build pro-accountability constituencies by addressing 
invisible power, see Essof and Kahn (2015) and Zulminarni 
and Miller (2015). For reader-friendly explanations of 
these concepts, see Gaventa (2006) and VeneKlasen 
and Miller (2008). See also the very relevant conceptual 
work for practitioners at: www.powercube.net and www.
justassociates.org
27 The concept of scaling up is widely used, particularly in 
the private sector, where it refers to growing companies 
and markets for products and services, as well as the social 
media process of “going viral” (the term has more than 5 
million Google hits). The prospect of reducing costs per 
unit through economies of scale is a major driver, insofar as 
scaling allows for doing more with less (World Bank 2016b). 
In Silicon Valley, “scaling” often refers specifically to seeking 
an inflection point when linear growth turns to exponential 
growth (thanks to Michael Fox for this observation). This 
approach is very compatible with the key challenge of 
broadening the geographic reach of an accountability 
initiative, from one to many localities, districts, cities 
or provinces. Yet identifying the factors that enable 
discontinuous institutional change is a challenge.
28 Whether or not the hoped-for iterative learning process 
actually feeds back in the process is an open, empirical 
question, since the literature recognises that innovations 
that are successful at the pilot level may end up being 
significantly simplified or otherwise changed in order 
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to facilitate replication or increased uptake. This is an 
especially serious challenge when the idea is to scale 
up institutionalised forms of citizen participation in 
development. For diverse experiences, see Blackburn with 
Holland (1998).
29 The literature on how innovations are taken up highlights 
several enabling characteristics: (1) They should address a 
felt need; (2) Credibility evidence and advocates help; (3) 
They should be testable without committing the potential 
constituency to making a full investment; (4) The results 
should be observable; (5) There should be a clear advantage 
over existing practices; (6) They should be easy to adopt – 
and “compatible with the potential users’ established values, 
norms and facilities” (Simmons and Shiffman 2007: 7). 
Notably, several of these characteristics are not associated 
with the vertical integration proposition, which poses a 
challenge for uptake and suggests the need for first-movers 
to “prime the pump”.
30 Walji (2016: 184) points out that in order to get uptake 
for innovations in a large, slow-moving institution like 
the World Bank, serving as a platform to promote already 
existing innovations may be more effective than incubating 
new ideas. 
31 For an application of the last mile concept, applied 
to analysis of efforts by senior-level policy reformers to 
improve frontline public sector performance in the context 
of social audits in Andhra Pradesh, India, see Veeraraghavan 
(2015).  
32 This focus on perceptions of the actionability and 
relevance of information underscores the relevance of the 
remarkably underused concept of targeted transparency 
(Fung et al 2007).
33 The concept of state–society interfaces comes from 
development sociology (Long 1984).
34 This is not their term, but see the discussion in Polk and 
Knox (2015). Indeed, researchers in the ICT4D field have 
identified the need for more research on how ICT can be 
more relevant for excluded populations (Harris 2016). See 
also Nicholson, Nugroho and Rangaswamy (2016).
35 Thanks to Duncan Edwards for discussions about this issue.
36 While ICT lifts the constraints of the scope for the 
horizontal projection of voice, this may be limited to 
relatively simple declarative messages. Citizen voice that 
attempts to scale up deliberative processes need more 
institutional structure, and ICT can facilitate such initiatives. 
This would be the case for state-wide participatory 
budgeting, for example (Peixoto and Fox 2016a).
37 For diverse studies of deliberative citizen engagement 
processes, see Heller and Rao (2015).
38 Awareness and mobilisation in defensive response to 
perceived injustices or threats appear to spread much more 
rapidly than the capacity for the same constituencies to 
deliberate,  develop proposals and create the coalitions 
needed to move them forward.
39 For more on “hybrid” accountability, see Goetz and 
Jenkins (2001) and Ackerman (2004).
40 Keep in mind, however, that the goal of promoting citizen 
demand for accountability can be perverted when political 
entrepreneurs who disseminate disinformation manage 
to outflank the purveyors of evidence-based approaches, 
twisting the demand for public accountability into 
governmental stigmatisation and criminalisation of “others” 
(e.g. the mass incarceration of non-violent drug offenders in 
the USA; the “stop and frisk” policy in New York City, USA; 
police murders of low-level drug consumers in the Philippines; 
attacks on immigrants and refugees around the globe, etc.).
41 Tarrow (2005) calls such multi-level bridge-builders 
“rooted cosmopolitans” in his study of transnational 
civil society. The contribution of those actors whose 
social locations and cultural capital allow them to link 
otherwise disconnected social actors is also embedded 
in the important conceptual distinction between bonding 
and bridging social capital (Putnam 2000; Woolcock and 
Narayan 2000), a notion that in turn reaches back to the 
classic “strength of weak ties” (Granovetter 1973). That 
idea refers to the central role played by even modest 
external connections, to prevent the isolation of local social 
actors from allowing elites to crush them with impunity.
42 This paper does not attempt to address the dynamics of 
such a transition, though Fox and Aceron (2016) address 
many of the coalitional challenges involved in building 
bridges between broad-based membership organisations 
and more technical or national capital city-oriented CSOs.
43 For important exceptions, see the cases in Silva (2013), 
especially the work of Spalding (2013, 2015) and von Bülow 
(2013). The Silva collection is especially strong on the 
dynamics of scale shift from the national to transnational 
arenas, though the local–subnational–national links tend 
to be subsumed under the generic category of “domestic” 
politics. For a recent analysis of scale shifts, both up and 
down, between local, state and national political arenas, see 
Pande’s analysis of India’s right to information campaign 
(2016).
44 On processes of discontinuous institutional change, see 
Woolcock (2013).
45 Consider the case of the South African government. It 
ranks at the top of the International Budget Partnership’s 
global transparency index but its disclosures are too 
aggregated to provide civil society with the tools needed to 
address citizen about public sector problems – a challenge 
recognised by the International Budget Partnership (Van Zyl 
and Kruuse 2015).
46 For more on the potential for collaboration and mutual 
empowerment between government audit institutions and 
citizen action, see Cornejo et al (2013) and UN (2013). 
47 The distinction between scaling up as more quantity of 
“X” versus a more qualitative emphasis on the nature of 
scale or scaling impact (as in taking scale into account) 
may have analogy in the open data movement. Anna 
Levy suggests that some open data advocates share an 
assumption that more is better, which elides a focus on what 
kind of openness may have the most impact (e.g. targeted 
transparency) (email communication, 25 September 2016).
48 This application of the concept originated in a CSO effort to 
monitor World Bank projects in Mexico in the second half of 
the 1990s; see Fox (2001) and Fox and Aceron (2016). Since 
then, explicit discussion of multi-level citizen oversight has 
been rare in the TPA field; see Garza (2013) for an exception. 
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49 One analyst (Kuris 2015) distinguishes between oversight 
agencies whose mandate is to shed a spotlight, versus those 
(few) that have some prosecutorial powers, in terms of 
“watchdogs” versus “guard dogs”.
50 Answerability without enforcement can be called a “soft” 
form of accountability, in contrast to the “hard” version, 
which combines the two (Fox 2007a).
51 In other words, the question of how the coordination of 
multi-level monitoring and oversight is governed (more 
versus less centralisation, more versus less participation) is 
distinct from whether there is coordination.
52 In her comments on this paper, Joy Aceron of G-Watch 
in the Philippines responded: “This concept of ‘squeezing 
the balloon’ can capture how the problem of corruption and 
impunity in procurement evolved in the Philippines. Initially, 
the leakage was in the execution. When this was being 
addressed through monitoring efforts, such as Textbook 
Count, Bayanihang Eskwela [Cooperation in Schools], [and] 
Bantay Lansangan [Road Watch], corrupt activities shifted 
to pre-bidding activities, such as in the designing of the 
bid and the negotiation among bidders. Then, even before 
this was addressed, corruption shifted to payment, where 
even without completing expected outputs, payments were 
already being given to suppliers. There were also anecdotal 
cases of collusion among bidders and government officials 
to circumvent the monitoring process. In one set of cases, 
for example, corrupt bidders would avoid a locality where 
monitoring was being done; and go to another locality where 
no monitoring was going on. There were also allegations 
that local government officials who own companies that bid 
for government projects would not take part in the bidding 
process in their own localities. Instead, they would simply 
go to a neighbouring locality where they could bid. Since 
the monitoring that [was] being done in different localities 
did not necessarily coordinate or interface, the corrupt 
could usually get away with it, often by coordinating with 
the official in the other locality.” (Email communication, 3 
October 2016).
53 The World Development Report also declined to address 
the frequent tendency for local citizen voice initiatives to 
be captured by local elites and turned into instruments 
of clientelism (e.g. in the case of “community-managed” 
schools; see Altschuler 2013). World Bank researchers later 
showed that this pattern was a widespread problem with 
“induced” (i.e. top-down) community participation efforts 
(Mansuri and Rao 2013).  
54 CARE is the NGO with the longest international track 
record in social accountability, having pioneered Community 
Scorecards in Malawi in 2002 (before the 2004 World 
Development Report), and has produced the most robust 
international CSO literature. A thorough political economy 
analysis of its work in four African countries found that 
it had greater impact when local efforts were combined 
with high-level coalitions with policy-makers to encourage 
responsiveness (Wild, Wales and Chambers 2015). One of 
their key findings, however, is that “impacts are often ‘stuck’ 
at the local level and have only translated into national 
level impacts where they have plugged into existing reform 
processes” (involving upwards accountability), and that 
there is “little evidence of purely ‘institutional’ impacts, 
such as significant changes in power relations” (Wild et 
al 2015: 7). The study does not show evidence that CARE 
supported any efforts for its community engagement 
processes to monitor the chain of governmental decisions 
about service provision beyond the local level. In the case of 
CARE’s extensive, sustained work in Malawi, a recent bulletin 
reports that even after so many years, the “disconnect 
between government levels” is a “disabling factor” in 
its social accountability work (CARE no date: 4). CARE’s 
most vertically-integrated accountability work has been in 
Peru, where it supported grassroots citizen monitoring of 
health policy in coordination with ForoSalud, the national 
advocacy coalition, and the regional ombudsman office in 
the province of Puno (Aston 2015; Frisancho 2015). Aston 
(2015) concludes by emphasising the need for “multi-tiered 
engagement”. For more information on CARE’s work in this 
area, see: http://governance.care2share.wikispaces.net/
CSC+Case+Studies,+Briefs,+Reports,+Videos
55 The term “high touch” refers to relationships between 
service providers and clients that involve close relationships.
56 There are several CSO campaigns to hold the World Bank 
accountable to its commitment to ostensibly mandatory 
“safeguard” policies. Many of the concerns raised by these 
campaigns involve non-compliance with enlightened official 
provisions intended to assess, avoid and mitigate social and 
environmental harm before irreversible decisions are made. 
For example, in the case of World Bank compliance with 
its own involuntary resettlement policy, its own pioneering 
1994 internal review found that one of its main problems 
involved a pattern of underestimating the size of the 
population that was projected to be displaced.
57 See Fox and Aceron (2016) and Fox and Halloran (2016) 
for summaries of several cases of partial vertical integration.
58 This is one of the findings from a multi-case comparative 
analysis of integrated issue campaigns in the Philippines 
(Aceron and Isaac 2016, forthcoming).
59 For discussions of the roles of infomediaries, see 
Magalhaes, Roseira and Strover (2013) and van Schalkwyk, 
Caňares, Chattapadhyay and Andrason (2015).
60 Thanks to Duncan Edwards for encouraging this point to 
be explicit.
61 See: www.fixmystreet.com
62 Studies of feedback loops sometimes assume – rather 
than demonstrate – that they close. Consider a major 
World Bank book on feedback loops (Gigler and Bailur 
2014). While many of the citizen voice platforms cited 
have generated uptake, in none of these do feedback 
loops actually close, in the sense of effective government 
responsiveness (e.g. that collection concludes with an 
emphasis on the metaphor of the Loch Ness monster, which 
implies – quite unintentionally – that the closing of feedback 
loops is something widely believed to exist, but there is little 
reliable evidence for this).
63 The second half of this paragraph draws from Fox (2014).
64 This raises the issue of how to address the challenge of 
what Mansuri and Rao (2013) call “civil society failure”, i.e. 
social contexts with limited capacity for autonomous, pro-
accountability collective action. Where traditions of scaled-
up self-organisation are weak, freedom of association is 
limited or cultural and linguistic differences complicate the 
projection of voice, the role of interlocutors becomes central 
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(Fowler 2014; Tembo 2013). Interlocutors are facilitators 
of two-way communication and their role is often crucial 
for bridging cultural and power gaps. In contrast to tactical 
approaches that assume that information will by itself 
motivate action among subordinated people, strategies that 
emphasise interlocutors recognise that for the voiceless to 
exercise voice effectively requires support, as well as cross-
cultural translation and bridge-building (Fox 2014).
65 This recalls the issues addressed in the recent World Bank 
Policy Research Report (2016a), and at the beginning of this 
paper, on the importance of public information strategies 
that can help citizens to influence policy-makers. Yet this 
approach treats the potential for action as narrowly limited 
to individuals casting ballots, rather than as collective 
social, civic or political actors who may need intermediary 
associations to represent their interests and ideas to both 
the state and political parties.
66 The following section draws from Fox and Aceron (2016). 
See Aceron and Isaac (2016, forthcoming) for a comparison 
of issue campaigns, which analyses them through this 
lens to document how they articulate policy advocacy and 
monitoring.
67 Practitioner-oriented advocacy strategists have produced 
sophisticated frameworks that draw on power analysis; see 
Cohen, de la Vega and Watson (2001), Unsicker (2013) and 
VeneKlasen and Miller (2008). Mainstream scholarly analyses 
of advocacy, which also includes the study of lobbying, tends 
to define the concept narrowly, not necessarily articulated 
with broader campaigning and collective action. See 
Manheim (2011) for a notable exception.
68 At local levels, these campaigns against displacement and 
devastation were struggles for survival and resistance. For 
global advocacy campaigns challenging the World Bank, 
they were “case studies” of systemic flaws in both policy and 
project decision-making.
69 In response to this proposition, Joy Aceron reported 
an example from the Philippines: “A CSO coalition formed 
for a national monitoring initiative included both national 
capital NGOs focused on advocacy and local–regional civic 
organisations focused on monitoring. Yet when the bottom-
up monitoring discovered irregularities, the national capital 
NGOs opted to be ‘constructive’ – which meant raising the 
issue privately with senior officials. From the point of view 
of the local-regional civic organisation, this meant that the 
problem was not adequately addressed, since they saw no 
official action.” (Email communication, 24 September 2016).
70 On the relevance of broad coalitions for bolstering the 
credibility of policy advocacy, see, for example, Larsen 
(2016). See also Brown and Fox (1998) on the importance 
of “national problem coalitions” in the context of policy 
advocacy campaigns.
71 Thanks to Chad Dobson for sharing the “Wizard of Oz” 
phrase in 1996.
72 Among many discussions of the territorial unevenness of 
state capacity, see O’Donnell (1993).
73 See the five cases sketched out in Fox and Halloran 
(2016).
74 This underscores the distinction between a narrow 
definition of transparency (limited to public access to 
official documents and data) and the broader notion of the 
public’s right to know, which goes further to include access 
to information about who are the winners and losers of 
government decisions, and about how those decisions (and 
non-decisions) were made.
75 Stone (1989) spells out the crucial agenda-setting power 
of framing in her discussion of the importance of causal 
stories for targeting and weakening obstacles to change.
76 Examples of broad-based, multi-level advocacy and 
monitoring campaigns that followed this pattern include 
Perempuan Kepala Keluarga (Pekka) in Indonesia, which 
won legal standing for women-headed households, and 
Malawi’s “Our Bodies, Our Lives” movement of HIV-positive 
women, which won a commitment from the national health 
system to provide appropriate anti-retroviral medicines. See 
Essof and Kahn (2015) and Zulminarni and Miller (2015).
77 For analytical and conceptual debates in what could be 
called the “mainstream” of the (mainly Northern) political 
sociology literature on social movements, see, among 
others: Rossi and von Bulow (2015); Tilly and Tarrow 
(2015); von Stekelenburg, Roggeband and Klandermans 
(2013); Maney, Kutz-Flamenbaum, Rohlinger and Goodwin 
(2012); Tarrow (2010); Van Dyke and McCammon (2010); 
Davenport, Johnston and Mueller (2005); Tarrow and 
McAdam (2005); Goodwin and Jasper (2004); McAdam et al 
(2001); Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly (1999); McAdam (1982 / 
1999). These approaches focus on identifying mechanisms 
and processes, and attempt to reconcile the roles of ideas, 
interests and institutions. These framework-building efforts 
are distinct from, yet potentially complementary to, more 
ethnographic or embedded research methods. See also the 
Journal of Social Movement Studies and Mobilization, among 
others. For an emerging practitioner-oriented literature, 
addressed in part to donors, see, among others: Keseru 
(2016); Halloran (2015, 2014); Halloran and Flores (2015); 
Joyce (2015); Joyce and Walker (2015); Stephan, Lakhani 
and Naviwala (2015).
78 A regime’s political legitimacy can be defined as “just the 
suspension of the withdrawal of consent” (Przeworski 1985: 
146). 
79 On the relationship between mobilisation and repression, 
see Davenport et al (2005). On social movement and 
advocacy campaign impacts on the state, see Giugni et al 
(1999) and Gaventa and McGee (2010). There is also a rich 
literature specifically on broad-based, non-violent resistance 
movements, for example Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), 
Erikson Nepstad (2011) and Zunes, Kurtz and Asher (1999).
80 Gaventa and McGee (2010) move in this direction. More 
often in the TPA literature, the link between information and 
motivations for collective action is assumed rather than 
problematised. Joshi (2015) takes this on with a causal 
chain approach.
81 This draws from the classic “political opportunity 
structure” approach (McAdam 1982 / 1999).
82 While studies of protest movements often emphasise their 
outsider nature, in practice many also include elements 
of insider–outsider coalitions that are either clandestine 
or ideologically inconvenient to recognise (especially for 
international sympathisers). Consider the international 
literature on Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement, most of 
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which has downplayed its significant degree of penetration 
by the state, especially in the administration of agrarian 
reform and rural public education. For example, on the 
movement’s long-term “co-production” of rural public 
education, see Tarlau (2013). 
83 Though constructive engagement, partnerships are quite 
common; they are justified more often on the grounds 
of short-term political expediency (allies in government) 
or institutional constraints (e.g. the World Bank) than on 
extensive empirical evidence that identifies the conditions 
under which such partnerships actually lead to lasting 
institutional change. Indeed, it would be useful to apply a 
political economy analysis to a wide range of cases, in order 
to identify the interests and incentives that make successful 
state–society collaborative problem-solving possible.  
84 Recall that the political science literature on regime 
change distinguishes between liberalisation and 
democratisation. The former involves increased space for 
freedom of expression and association, while the latter 
involves space for actual contestation of the power to 
govern.
85 Public analysis of how development agencies in the 
global North can direct politically and culturally appropriate 
support to grassroots accountability movements in the 
global South, while avoiding unintended consequences, is in 
its early stages. See, for example, Joyce (2015) and Stephan 
et al (2015). Guillán Montero (2016) explicitly addresses the 
implications of the vertical integration proposal for donors.
86 This interpretation draws from the author’s active 
participation in the 2015 and 2016 Global Partners Forums 
of the Global Partnership for Social Accountability, hosted by 
the World Bank.
87 Thanks to Brendan Halloran for this suggestion. 
88 For example, Mexico’s high-profile public information 
agency’s adjudication board rules primarily in favour of 
citizens (Fox, Haight and Palmer-Rubin 2011). Mexico’s 
national information access law was recently ranked 
number one in the world (see: www.rti-rating.org). For 
context, see Fox and Haight (2010), among others. This 
public information access system, combined with persistent 
systemic impunity for abuse and corruption, has turned 
Mexico into a striking paradigm case of a disconnect 
between transparency and accountability.
89 India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
recognises that social audits contribute to accountability 
by mandating their implementation in the programme 
(Pande 2016, 2014). Social audits have been carried out 
on a massive scale in the states of Andhra Pradesh and 
Telangana (Veeraraghavan 2015; Maiorano 2014), as well 
as to an increasing degree in Madhya Pradesh (Halloran 
2016a).
90 See Aceron (2016), as well as Guerzovich and Rosenzweig 
(2013), Arugay (2012), Gregorio (2006) and Parafina (no 
date).
91 On the campaign for the reproductive health law, see: 
Cornelio (2016, forthcoming); Estrada-Claudio (2015); 
Melgar (2014); Ocampo (2014); Parmaland (2014); Cabral 
(2013) and Estrada-Claudio and Ibarra (2012); Research 
on the implementation of the law has mainly involved official 
policy evaluations (e.g. DOH 2015).
92 From email communication with Dr Junice Demeterio 
Melgar, Likhaan, 12 September 2016: “Before the RPRH 
[Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health] Law 
… the main system and indicators for what was called the 
MNCHN [maternal, neonatal, child health and nutrition] 
programme of the DOH [Department of Health] was based 
on reports of the 1,600 plus Local Government Units 
[LGUs] collated by the DOH regional offices and vetted by 
the DOH’s Field Health Statistics and Information System 
(FHSIS), which is lodged in the Bureau of Epidemiology. 
The monitoring covered mainly service delivery, and only 
service delivery by LGUs, from the municipal to the city 
and provincial levels. It did not include service delivery by 
government hospitals (primary to tertiary), by private and 
NGO facilities (all levels). It did not include input indicators, 
e.g. human resources, budget, logistics, service delivery 
organisation and governance.”
93 The monitoring did not address, for example, the possibility 
that political bosses managed to use the programme for 
clientelistic control. Considering the persistence of regional 
bosses and vote buying in the Philippines, this may have 
been related to the (recognised) problems of inclusion and 
exclusion. In principle, clientelistic control over access to 
the programme could be quite consistent with apparent 
compliance with official conditionalities (e.g. low income 
levels, participation in health and education programmes). 
For broader discussion of the persistence of clientelistic 
manipulation within social programmes, see Fox (2012). 
One possible explanation for why this risk was not on the 
monitoring agenda might be the lack of political space in 
this region; another would be the issue’s lack of fit with 
donor and / or national government priorities. National 
government partners reportedly claimed that the programme 
design would render it immune from political manipulation; 
independent monitoring would have tested that hypothesis.
94 Interview with Aniceta C. Baltar, Concerned Citizens of 
Abra for Good Governance, by Joy Aceron, 15 September 
2016 (email communication).
95 For overviews of the right to food campaign, see Hertel 
(2016, 2015) and Pande and Houtzager (2016). On efforts 
to reform public distribution systems and the challenge of 
measuring leakages, see: Dreze and Khera (2015, 2013); 
Pritchard and Choitani (2015); Balani (2013); Khera 
(2011a, 2011b); and Masiero (2015). See Pande and 
Houtzager (2016) and Pande (2008) for a focus on reform 
efforts and the limitations of public distribution systems, 
both nationally and in Delhi. For the historical context and 
details on the operation of public distribution systems 
in south India, see Goetz and Jenkins (2002) and Mooji 
(1996). For a creative research experiment that shows the 
potential anti-corruption power of information requests, see 
Peisakin and Pinto (2010).
96 See Gulati and Saini (2015) and Kotwa, Ramaswami and 
Murugkhar (2011), among others. The federal government 
intends to replace the public distribution systems system 
with individual payments through a biometric card system, 
but the limite reach of the banking system and denial of 
access because of problems with the fingerprint-based 
access system are provoking resistance; see, for example: 
Bhatnagar (2016); Yadav (2016); Sharma, P. (2015).
97 See Joshi, Sinha and Patnaik (2016), Parakesh and 
Masiero (2015) and Puri (2012). The state of Chhattisgarh 
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stands out as relatively successful, after more than a 
decade of CSO advocacy and state-led problem-solving 
to greatly improve the food programme’s efficiency and 
coverage, which now reaches 80% of the population. 
The state’s 11,000 public distribution system shops are 
managed by local governments, and agricultural and 
consumer cooperatives. “Panchayats are definitely easier 
while asserting demand for accountability from them. 
Agriculture cooperatives are under direct government 
control and are also amenable to community oversight. 
Consumer cooperatives are more difficult as they are 
almost private sector. There are no studies comparing 
the performance of consumer cooperatives with rest. 
Corruption issues persist, but involving procurement more 
than distribution.” (Email communication from Samir 
Garg, right to food campaign, Chhattisgarh, to Suchi 
Pande, Accountability Research Center, 6 September 
2016). Grassroots monitoring of the food programme in 
this state is also strengthened by its incorporation into 
a robust, broad-based grassroots community of health 
workers and public health committees (Binaj Patnaik, email 
communication to J. Fox, 26 August 2016). 
98 On CSO participation and community monitoring in the 
National Rural Health Mission, see: Das (2015); Khanna 
(2015, 2013); Shukla, Sinha and Jadhav (2015); Shukla and 
Sinha (2014); See also: www.cbmpmaharashtra.org and 
www.nrhmcommunityaction.org/agcasecretariatteam.html, 
among others.
99 On SATHI, see: Halloran (2016a), Khanna (2013) and 
www.sathicehat.org 
100 Abhay Shukla (SATHI), email communication, 20 
November 2016.
101 Shukla, Scott and Kakde (2011) and Abhay Shukla 
(SATHI), email communication, 2 September 2016.
102 Other state government-sponsored participatory 
health monitoring initiatives include the notable Mitanin 
programme in Chhattisgarh (e.g. Nambiar and Sheikh 2016; 
Vir, Kalita, Mondal and Malik 2014).
103 Invited spaces are arenas for dialogue between 
authorities and citizens in which the terms of engagement 
are set by the authorities. Claimed or created spaces, in 
contrast, are spaces which have been “claimed by less 
powerful actors from or against the power holders, or 
created more autonomously by them” (Gaventa 2006: 
27; see also Cornwall and Schattan Coelho 2007). The 
community food council experience shows that invited 
spaces can be claimed from below and gain autonomy in 
spite of official resistance: in this case, thanks in part to a 
sandwich strategy (Fox 2015). As one director of Diconsa 
exhorted in a national meeting of the more autonomous food 
councils: “You push below, and I will squeeze from above” 
(Fox 1992b).
104 Free spaces are enabling environments for autonomous 
collective action by members of subordinated social groups 
(Polletta 1999). 
105 A new, ongoing research project is attempting to assess 
which enclaves of regional-level citizen-oversight power 
remain.
106 See: Díaz Echeverría and Gruenberg (2016); Freyermuth, 
Carrasco-Gómez, Romero-Martínez (2016); Freyermuth, 
Arguello Avendaño and Zarco Mera (2014); Freyermuth, 
Sánchez, and Argüello (2014); Freyermuth and Sesia 
(2013); Layton, Campillo Carrete, Ablanedo Terrazas and 
Sanchez Rodriguez (2010); Díaz Echeverría (2006). The last 
of these explicitly refers to this policy advocacy effort as 
a “vertical alliance”. For a nuanced analysis of monitoring 
and advocacy in the state of Guerrero, see Berrío Palomo 
(2016) For analysis of one of the regional affiliates of the 
Oaxaca state branch of the campaign, see Ocejo (2011); see 
also: www.omm.org.mx. This case also stands out because 
much of the TPA field has lacked a gender perspective. For 
exceptions, see the work of Just Associates and Sneeringer, 
Canfield Hurd and Cox Mehling (2015).
107 Extensive joint evaluations include Freyermuth, Argüello 
and Zarco Mera (2014), INM (2011) and the higher profile 
CONEVAL (2012). The evaluation in CONEVAL (2012) 
reveals government control over agenda-setting.  
108 Note that all Mexican health policy monitoring and 
advocacy initiatives strategically linked federal- and state-
level work; one project concentrated just on creating new, 
more precise federal budget categories, based on the 
assumption that this would facilitate monitoring by others, 
but this did not happen (Ocejo 2013). In retrospect, this was 
a tactical initiative focused on just one level of government, 
in contrast to the Maternal Mortality Observatory’s strategic 
combination of tactics, at multiple levels.
109 The Guerrero Women’s Health Network’s monitoring of 
and protest against the government’s failure to complete 
the promised women’s hospitals in Atoyac and Tecpan is 
a notable example: it was sustained in spite of ongoing 
state-sanctioned repression in the region. See: Magaña and 
Escobar (2016); Rodríguez Flores (2016); Valadez Luviano 
(2016a, 2016b).
110 For the results of a strategic use by a CSO of public 
information requests to monitor government reproductive 
health policy more generally, see GIRE (2016, 2013). For 
brief case studies of family planning advocacy in other 
countries, see IPPF (2012). For a review of accountability 
initiatives related to reproductive choice, see Boydell and 
Fox (2016) and Boydell and Keesbury (2014). 
111 The term “citizen action” is used in its broadest 
sense and is not intended to be limited to those who are 
formally ascribed to the nation state in which they live. For 
conceptual discussion of different definitions of citizenship, 
see Fox (2005).
112 See, for example, Bannerjee, Glennerster and Duflo 
(2008).
113 See Boydell and Fox (2016) for references to relevant 
literature specifically on health workers.
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